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Abstract 
This study investigates the vulnerability to fire and preparedness of New Zealand’s 
stadia for effective evacuations. The study covers aspects of crowd behaviour, 
observational findings and issues that must be considered when accommodating crowds. 
It provides an overview of the features stadia use to protect stadium patrons from fire, 
and a brief history of some famous stadium incidents and their contribution to the 
profile of the modern stadium.  
 
In 2001 there were two major mass casualty fire disasters in highly populated buildings 
in the USA. Subsequently there has been increased attention placed on the vulnerability 
of high profile sites and gathering places to large-scale mass casualty events. Effective 
mitigation in such variable populations is two-part: evacuation and protection of the 
populous. 
 
New Zealand (NZ) does not have work-place buildings of the scale of those in other 
developed countries such as the USA. The largest capacity structures in New Zealand 
are entertainment venues, namely stadia. In 2002 New Zealand had ten operational large 
stadia with the capacity to accommodate in excess of 20,000 patrons. The NZ Fire 
Service has attended 28 call outs to these stadia over the last 3.5 years. Three of these 
call-outs were to attend actual fires. By identifying issues particular to stadia 
evacuations (structural and management practice) it is hoped gain insight as to how to 
prevent New Zealand stadia from entering the international list of major mass casualty 
case studies. 
 
Experiments performed in this study included; 
• Analysis of the observed flow movements of egressing crowds at stadia 
• Simulation of stadium egress using modelling software  
• Estimated crowd flow potential based on previous pedestrian movement studies 
and standard calculations. 
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The results obtained by these methods were then compared in order to establish their 
relative consistency and credibility when applied to the New Zealand stadium crowd 
environment. 
 
In the course of this study it was found that there is a lack of consistency across New 
Zealand stadia in both fire protection and crowd management practices. In several 
instances, overseas regulations and codes have been adapted for use in the different 
New Zealand stadia. International practice with regards to stadium design and egress 
requirements for such varies; hence a review of different international codes and 
standards was incorporated into the study because of their applicability to New Zealand 
practice.  
 
Experimental analysis showed marked variation in the results obtained for egress when 
applying different methods of estimation. This relates to the underlying assumptions 
made in applying the various methods and their appropriateness to the particular 
dynamics of a “stadium crowd”. 
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1 Introduction 
Stadia have facilitated large crowds since their inception. With modern design 
techniques, the size and facilities of these venues have evolved and changed 
dramatically. In contrast to many other structures designed to hold large populations, 
stadia are subject to ever changing occupants and uses. Whereas a shopping malls and 
high-rises house the same occupancies for months to years, a modern stadium 
transforms itself weekly. It may facilitate a sporting event one weekend and then host an 
exposition through the week. With a stadium, not only do events and event management 
teams change frequently but so do retail concessions around the grounds. This rapid 
turnover of occupants and uses has greatly changed the considerations in stadium design 
since their early beginnings. 
 
In the last decade most of New Zealand’s stadia have undergone major renovations and 
modifications to allow them to accommodate more diverse activities than their original 
designs allowed for. Corporate suites are increasingly being used by owners as offices 
and or function rooms increasing non-event occupancy numbers and events are 
becoming more frequent. In order to attract high profile events and cater to corporate 
ownership, the modern stadium must be well furnished and provide a wide array of 
conveniences for both performers and patrons. As the quality of the stadium and the 
demand to see a performance or game increases, so does the acceptability of higher 
prices and hence potential profit to the owners. New Zealand’s stadia capacities range 
from less than 10,000 to 50,000, with larger stadia being in the areas of the country with 
higher population densities. New Zealand stadia are relatively small by international 
standards so a greater number of events must be held to achieve an acceptable level of 
profitability; hence there is much pressure for stadia to attract more diverse events than 
for their larger counterparts overseas.  
 
Large population densities occur in stadia, creating the potential for significant numbers 
of casualties and deaths should an untoward incident occur. Thankfully untoward 
incidents such as fires are uncommon1. Even so; it might be expected that as building 
technology has developed there would be a drop in the frequency of fires in this type of 
structure. This has not been the case. In fact, stadia disasters in general, including fires, 
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have steadily increased in number and severity over the last few decades (Table 1). This 
may be partially attributable to increased usage and capacities.  
 
Stadium disasters are rare; however they have resulted in approximately 3000 physical 
casualties over the last decade worldwide. Individual incidents involve large numbers of 
casualties and hence have a greater impact on the community than less sensational 
incidents that occur more frequently such as car crashes2. The disasters that have 
occurred have largely been a result of egress problems. The vast majority of disasters 
have occurred at soccer stadia; however there is no reason to assume that New Zealand 
is invulnerable to this sort of tragedy based simply on sporting codes. Indeed, fire call-
out statistics indicate that New Zealand’s stadia have been subject to a number of minor 
fires in the past and it may simply be a matter of time before a more serious incident 
occurs. 
 
Although only a fraction of stadia disasters occur as a direct result of fires, egress and 
evacuation procedures are crucial in preventing tragedy should a fire occur. 
Psychologists have found that crowds do not tend to behave as individuals do. As there 
are many individual behaviour patterns there are also many crowd behaviour patterns. 
Flight behaviour and subsequent crushing has been illustrated in a variety of structures 
fires involving crowds. In the majority of the events in Table 1, insufficient egress 
and/or poor crowd management contributed to the resulting injuries and fatalities.  
 
At this point New Zealand has only experienced a handful of stadium fires, of which no 
casualties have resulted (Appendix D). In line with international trends, many New 
Zealand stadia have been upgraded in the last decade, but against international trends 
there has not been an increase in disasters or potential disaster incidents. This study 
hopes to determine whether or not this is due to a fortunate lack of the occurrence of 
low probability incidents. 
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Year Location Country Incident Contributing factors Injuries Fatalities 
1902 Ibrox UK Structural Failure  517 26 







Escalator gate closed, Human 
error 
60 1 
1964 Lima Peru 
Stampede - 
Crushing 
Riot following referee decision 500 318 
1967 Kayseri Turkey Stampede 
Fighting weapons and resulting 
riot 
600 40 
1968 Buenos Aires Argentina 
Stampede - 
Crushing 
Hooliganism/Fire – burning 
paper thrown on crowd at 
egress bottle-neck  
200+ 74 or 73
1971 Salvador Brazil Stampede Fighting led to flight 1500 4 
1971 Ibrox UK 
Structural failure - 
Crushing 
Crowd behaviour egress reverse 
flow 
140 66 
1974 Cairo Egypt 
Stampede - 
Trampling 
Riot following referee decision  49 or 48
1979  Nigeria 
Stampede - 
Trampling 
Lighting failure led to flight  27 24 
1981 Athens Greece 
Stampede - 
Trampling 
Locked gate, no front to back 
communication 
? 24 




USSR Crushing Reverse flow in egress  61 or 340
1982 Cali Columbia 
Stampede - 
Trampling 
Intoxicated patrons inciting 
flight 
250 24 
1985 Bradford UK Fire 
Rubbish ignited poor 
housekeeping 
100+ 56 
1985 Mexico City Mexico Crushing 
No front to back 
communication at locked gates 
30 10 
1985 Heysel Brussels 
Structural failure - 
Crushing 
Crowd behaviour 437 39 
1988 Kathmandu Nepal 
Stampede - 
Crushing 
Hail storm led to flight, locked 
exits no front to back 
communications 
700 10 or 93






Inappropriate police behaviour 
and overcrowding 





Fighting led to flight against 
fences 
1900 40 
1992 Bastia Corsica Structural failure 








Structural failure - 
Crushing 
















Inappropriate police behaviour scores 12 
2000 Sao Januário  Brazil 
Stampede - 
Crushing 
Fighting and oversold event 200  




Crowd behaviour and oversold 
event 
hundreds 47 
2001 Accra Ghana 
Stampede - 
Crushing 
Inappropriate police behaviour 277 126 
2001 Akashi Japan Crushing 
Insufficient egress due to poor 
organisation and planning 
120 10 
Table 1: Stadium Disasters over the last century adapted from Dickie3 and Fruin4 
Table 1 shows mostly non-fire related disasters. Amongst these incidents there is a prevalence of 
crushings as crowds attempted to flee undesirable events. In most stadia disasters that have occurred 
over the last 30 years crowd behaviour has been the main contributor to the casualties. In some instances 
conflicting or non-specific numbers were available. 
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1.1 Profile of New Zealand Stadia 
Stadia, for the purpose of this thesis, should not be confused with indoor arenas. Indoor 
arenas are permanently fully enclosed. Indoor arenas are single structures. In contrast, 
stadia have an outdoor arena surrounded by stand and embankment structures. Some 
stadia may have sliding roofs that can cover the arena when desired but the majority of 
the time the arena is not covered. No stadia in New Zealand have sliding roofs, all are 
permanently uncovered.  
 
There are three schools of thought as to why New Zealand stadia have avoided major 
incident. The first is that it is because of the quality of their structures and management 
practice. The second is that it is primarily due to good fortune. The third is a 
combination of the other two. Regardless of the cause New Zealand stadia are less 
likely to experience a major incident or as severe an incident than in some other 
countries. This is purely because New Zealand’s population base does not support the 
usage patterns enjoyed by the likes of say Australian stadia. 
1.1.1 Event Times 
A study on the probability of major fires occurring in Australian stadia gives some 
interesting results. Bennetts et al5 estimated, using Australian and international data, 
that the probability of a significant fire in a modern stadium during a major event is 
once in 952 years if the stadium is not sprinklered and once in 47, 619 years if it is 
sprinklered (this assumes that 3% of fires have the potential to become large during 
occupied hours). Bennetts et al’s define a major event to be one with close to full 
capacity occupancy. Bennetts et al’s figures may therefore be misleading in that not all 
scheduled events are attended by capacity crowds. There figures are also biased in that 
their estimates are for fires occurring in furnished and storage areas of the stadium only.  
1.1.2 Non Event Times 
Outside of event times there can be as many as two hundred people in various parts of a 
stadium on a regular basis. These people are involved in catering, sporting practices, 
event management and various other activities. With such low occupant density the 
potential for a fire to develop unnoticed increases. This was illustrated in the Texas 
Stadium fire in the USA on October 13th, 19936.  
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The Texas Stadium fire occurred in the private suite area of the stadium on a non-event 
day. The suites concerned were accessible by corridors, internal stairwells and elevators. 
There was no open-air access to this part of the stadium. Cheerleaders practicing on the 
field detected the fire in the suite of fire origin and alerted the fire service. By the time 
fire fighters reached the fire, some three minutes later, it had had spread to twelve suites 
on two levels and to the plastic seating in the nearby bowl area.  
 
Before the fire was extinguished it had spread to several suites. Smoke had penetrated 
the adjoining corridor and entered the air-handling duct, resulting in smoke damage to a 
quarter of the suites in this part of the stadium. Heat melted vision panels in the suites 
affected by fire and through these openings smoke had vented into the playing field 
area.  
 
If Texas Stadium had had a greater occupancy at the time, such as that of an event day, 
one of two scenarios might have occurred. Firstly the fire might have been detected 
earlier and extinguished before it became established. Secondly the fire might not have 
been detected early enough to prevent its development, resulting in casualties in the 
surrounding rooms, hallway and main bowl area. 
 
What special considerations with respect to fire protection and evacuation are required 
for managing and designing a stadium as opposed to any other structure? It is widely 
accepted that management has as great a role to play in effective fire protection and 
evacuation as the design of the structure7. Currently New Zealand, unlike the UK8 and 
USA9, does not make any special provisions for such places. This study investigates 
whether it needs to, or whether current regulations and management practice are 
sufficient. 
 
Historically New Zealand legislature and regulations - with respect to safety - have for 
the most part developed responsively to major incidents and disasters in New Zealand 
(“stable door” legislation) or have mimicked changes in British legislature. An 
exception to this was when the UK passed the Safety at Sports Ground Act 1975 in 
response to incidents at sporting events and stadia. Although the potential loss 
associated with a stadium disaster appears insignificant when compared to the collective 
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loss from house fires annually, it would be a tragedy for such an event to occur simply 
because New Zealand did not adapt its regulations in response to the experience of other 
nations.  
 
The purpose of this thesis is to assess whether New Zealand stadia offer effective fire 
protection and evacuation procedures, to ensure the safety of all stadium occupants. 
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2 Objectives –  
The objectives of this thesis are to: 
 
• Examine the stadium occupant profile and determine how stadium occupants 
differ from occupants of other large capacity structures. The occupant profile has 
been limited to rugby and Australian football league game patrons so as to 
provide comparable demographics across multiple stadia 
 
• Examine past stadium fires and incidents resulting from egress issues. 
 
• Determine whether New Zealand stadia with the capacity to hold greater than 
20,000 patrons fit the profile of those stadia that have experienced disasters in 
the past. 
 
• Examine the coordination of stadium events in New Zealand to determine how 
effective evacuation of New Zealand stadia might be. 
 
• Compare evacuation calculations, simulations and observations to determine 
how accurately crowd movement has and is being anticipated in the stadium 
environment. 
 
• To identify current international trends in stadia with respect to fire protection 
and evacuation. 
 
• To determine whether New Zealand is inline with international practice.
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3 Literature Review 
3.1 The Development of Stadia 
As with most types of structure, stadia have changed as construction trends and 
consumer demands have dictated. Because of this there is great disparity between the 
construction and layout of a modern stadium, a partially upgraded stadium and an older 
style stadium. Stadia are large complexes and may consist of one or more structures. 
Due to cost and seasonal considerations the complexes may be constructed or modified 
in parts over a number of decades. This may mean reduced seating for a long period if 
the structures are being modified continuously or that larger discrete sections are 
modified at given intervals with construction occurring over a number of “off seasons”. 
Hence different parts of a stadium may be built to different specifications as what was 
common practice when the alterations were started is obsolete by the time the final 
stages are commenced. To understand some of the issues for egress planning and fire 
engineering at a stadium an overview of stadium constructions found in New Zealand 
has been included. 
3.1.1 Construction of older stadia 
Older style stadia are generally of timber or brick construction with lather and plaster 
finish. Seats consist of wooden benches or bleachers in single tier stands. Large sections 
provided no seating. Turnstile entries to the grounds were narrow and often set into 
concrete outer walls close to ticketing booths, as were the similarly narrow exits. 
 
Tiered grass or concrete embankments and terraces were often included around large 
parts of the arena as festival seating. These were traditionally the rowdiest sections of 
the stadium10. Tickets for these sections were cheaper than for seated sections as they 
provided less comfortable viewing and could accommodate more people per area than 
seated viewing areas. The stands may or may not have been roofed. Facilities under and 
around the stand consisted of changing rooms, public toilets, an office, ticketing booths, 
turnstiles, supporters’ club with a bar, score board, commentators box, storage space 
and a caretaker’s area. Vomitories and these other facilities were typically small and of 
brick or concrete block construction, designed to take up as little potential viewing 
space as possible. This has led to some stadia having somewhat complex egress paths. 
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This somewhat Spartan style of stadium remained typical for the first half of the 1900s 
possibly due to the influence of two world wars and the depression. 
3.1.1.1 Advantages 
Older stadia were low cost, low maintenance constructions requiring no more than a 
fresh coat of paint and someone to sweep up the rubbish after the games. The venues 
were designed to take the maximum number of people in the smallest possible space. 
When this type of stadia was in vogue people were used to queuing for war rations and 
other commodities. Queuing to get in and out of a stadium was no different to the 
queuing required for many other activities and the tolerance for delays was much higher 
than it is today. With only the radio as an alternative, those who wished to view an 
event had little alternative to patronising the stadium. 
3.1.1.2 Limitations 
• No or little provision for comfort was included. Generally events were restricted 
to daylight hours as lighting was only provided to those facilities under the stand 
that needed it. 
• Most stands were single tier so in order to accommodate larger crowds more 
land and deeper stands were required.  
• Patrons were often vulnerable to the weather. 
• Access in and out of the grounds was often limited by turnstiles. Vomitories and 
turnstiles were one person wide. Stairs were often steep and poorly lit. 
• No or very little provision was made for mobility-impaired patrons. 
• Police were responsible for crowd control 
• Fire engineering and pedestrian movement were not appropriately incorporated 
into designing the structure 
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3.1.1.3 Existing examples in New Zealand 
Parts of Carisbrook, and Eden Park are still of this type of construction. Jade Stadium 
retains only the Stevens Street Memorial Gates as a remnant of its earlier days. 
 
Figure 1 Stevens St Memorial Gate, Jade Stadium 
3.1.2 Construction 1970s – 1990s 
With the increase in air travel, improved roading, urbanisation, and television coverage 
of sporting events stadia, became more accessible and visible to the public. 
Consequently, many stadia were altered and new stadia built in an effort to attract 
international sporting events and the subsequent capacity crowds. In order to attract 
people to the stadium, the stadium had to be more appealing than competing 
alternatives. Stadia had to move away from the image of offering little more than just a 
cold pie and a spot to stand with your mates in the rain. Corporate sponsorship started to 
develop and the level of facilities began to exceed those of basic amenities. 
Christchurch has two early examples of this type of construction; the eastern stands at 
Jade Stadium and the stadium at QEII (then able to seat 34,000) both of which were 
constructed for the 1974 Commonwealth Games. Due to the incident at the 1972 
Olympic Games where nine Olympic athletes were taken hostage, safety of patrons and 
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competitors became a major focus of stadium management. Security features such as 
large gates allowing for emergency egress began to be incorporated into the designs. 
 
Multi-tier stadia were developed to accommodate more patrons, provide more space and 
improve viewing without increasing the distance from the field. This was especially 
important for existing stadia, as greater patronage could be accommodated without the 
need to purchase more land. For patrons this provided a viewing benefit by keeping all 
patrons close to the arena. It also introduced the additional benefit of providing shelter 
to the lower tiers without extensive roofing. The contrast between older and 1970s-90s 
styles is illustrated below by the two main Melbourne stadiums; Colonial Stadium and 
the Melbourne Cricket Ground (MCG). 
 
Figure 2 Colonial Stadium with its 
retractable roof open. Each level sits 
above the previous one providing a 
compact stadium with proximal views 







Figure 3 View of the MCG from the Great Southern Stand looking towards the Members Pavilion. Patrons in 
the back rows at the MCG are a great distance from the arena. 
 
Over time the comfort and quality of general patrons’ seating has improved, as has the 
quality of members’ lounges and corporate suites. This has led to an increase in the 
quantity of furnishings, kitchen facilities and car parking; hence a greater fire load is 
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present in some areas of the stadium than was ever envisaged for older style stadia. 
Some stadia, such as Aussie Stadium go so far as to include facilities such as television 
studios and nightclubs within their corporate and lounge structures. This alters the usage 
pattern of the stadium and may impact on the fire spread scenarios for the stadium in 
ways not anticipated in the design of pre-existing nearby structures within the stadium.  
 
Changing usage patterns, fire loads, proximity of patrons and capacity of stadia may 
vary considerably from the type of structure that was envisaged in determining the 
building code requirements for stadia. This was illustrated in two American stadium 
fires in 199311. 
 
The potential for fires in refurbished areas was realised in the USA in 1993 when two 
stadia; one in Texas and one in Georgia; experienced fires in their suite areas. Both 
stadia had been built in the 1960s and refurbished in the subsequent decades. Whilst no 
one was hurt in either event, both fires caused extensive localised damage. Both fires 
started by accident, one from a food warmer and one from electrical wiring. Both fires 
spread to other suites with one spreading to the plastic seating in the main arena. Both 
fires resulted in thick black smoke in corridors surrounding the fire. Smoke also entered 
the main arena through windows that fractured and melted as a result of the fires.12  
3.1.2.1 Advantages 
The increase in fire loading at stadia has not gone completely unnoticed. Stadia, just 
like any other type of structure, have for the large part continued to make improvements 
in fire safety. This has occurred in line with law changes and as technology and 
knowledge of fires and fire suppression has improved13. However because a stadium is 
large and is often made up of a number of structures some parts of the stadium may 
have escaped improvement as surrounding structures have been upgraded. 
 
Changes to stadium structures that have been introduced since the 1970s and enhance 
fire protection and evacuation of structures and patrons include: 
• streamlining egress paths 
• increasing exit numbers and widths 
• greater sign posting with fire procedures 
• installation of manual call points and sprinklers in covered areas 
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• no smoking policies 
• separate fire service access points 
• video surveillance 
• Dedicated power supplies for lighting 
• Intumescing pathway indicators 
• Greater uniformity of stairways 
• Installation of smoke alarms 
• Fold up seating (allows for less accumulation of rubbish) 
• Lower density of seated population on individual levels 
• Introduction of EWIS (emergency warning intercommunication systems) into 
the communication system. 
• The availability of television screens to relay information 
 
3.1.2.2 Failings 
As alluded to previously, stadia are not generally refurbished in one operation. The 
redevelopments tend to occur in stages over several years or even decades. This is so as 
to keep the stadium operational, maintaining near capacity crowds during the sporting 
season, and to spread the costs incurred over a longer period. In doing this, not all of the 
fire safety system is necessarily brought up to the current standards in a single phase. 
This increases the likelihood of a series of different contractors continuing upon 
previous work and the likelihood of disparity between the designed structure and the 
built structure. Examples of this were related during interviews at stadium visits around 
New Zealand. 
 
As with earlier stadium designs, many of this style of stadia have large quantities of 
fixed wooden seating. Most stadia in New Zealand that still have wooden seating are in 
the process of converting to folding plastic seating. The disadvantages of wooden 
seating are that it is easy for rubbish to accumulate under the seats and the seats take up 
more walk space than folding seats. Folding seats increase the available walk space 
once a person stands up. This makes removal of rubbish easier through improved access 
to the underside of seats by cleaners. Plastic seating also offers the stadium the 
advantages of low maintenance and comfortable seating.  
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3.1.3 Present Day Construction  
The modern stadium is now expected to be a multifunctional event centre. As such, fire 
engineering and evacuation planning are becoming increasingly important to designing 
stadia in order to provide safe venues under a wide range of circumstances14.  
 
Key characteristics of current stadium construction practice are: 
• Prestressed concrete and steel construction are now the construction materials of 
choice. Outdoor seating is predominantly plastic on metal frames. 
• Versatile, multi functional facilities within the structure. 
• High level of furnishings within corporate, function and administration sections 
of the structure. 
 
Stadia now provide facilities for corporate viewing, dining, special functions, vehicle 
access, under cover car parking, multimedia production areas, museums, catering, 
offices, indoor training areas, retail outlets, lounges, and security; as well as all the basic 
facilities found in a older style stadium. 
 
As stadia have become more complex, their construction materials have tended towards 
less combustible materials with increasing levels of fire resistance throughout. 
Unfortunately this does not necessarily translate to greater property protection. The 
potential for smoke, fire and water damage to the contents of suites, lounges and other 
facilities as a consequence of fire has increased as the level of furnishings and electrical 
equipment has increased. 
 
Bennetts et al15 identify the potential for smoke logging in narrow corridors to the rear 
of corporate suites as a potential hazard. This situation could develop before occupants 
in suites adjacent to the fire are aware of the need to evacuate. Consequently it may be 
necessary to provide shorter egress routes than those required by the building code16.  
 
The size of stadium corridors is such that they could accommodate rapid smoke filling. 
If the entertainment event in progress is particularly exciting crowd noise may obscure 
initial sounders and/or patrons in surrounding suites may be engrossed to the point 
where they delay leaving and subsequently become trapped17. 
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3.1.4 Future construction 
Superstadiums have been developed overseas, but at this point New Zealand does not 
have the population to justify such structures18. It has therefore been hypothesised that 
there will be no major changes from current stadium design in the near future.19  
 
The most likely change is in the proportion of suite and lounge facilities. The potential 
for a greater proportion of the stadium to comprise of suite facilities has increased with 
the introduction of corporate sponsorship. This means that the level of comfort and 
aesthetics of the stadium venue is likely to incorporate greater quantities of furnishings 
and catering facilities. This is likely to improve the fire safety of older stadia as 
modifying or replacing existing structures will mean that the fire protection afforded 
those structures will have to be upgraded. This does not however mean that the level of 
protection required under the existing building code or in overseas codes is sufficiently 
relevant to the ever changing usage and contents of these structures. 
3.2 International Practice 
There are three main issues that were addressed in researching this paper: 
• Identifying risk posed by fire in stadia 
• Identifying variables that affect evacuation of a stadium 
• Comparing regulations and guidelines used to manage these variables and risks 
It was noted that different countries have addressed these issues in different ways. 
 
Many variables play a part in fire prevention and effective evacuation of stadia. The 
diversity of stadia that have been involved in fires and evacuation problems make it 
difficult to generalise as to which variables play a greater role than others.  
 
Some of the variables that affect evacuation concern human behaviour of the occupants, 
such as: 
• Sobriety of patrons 
• Anonymity within the crowd 
• Euphoria of the crowd 
• Familiarity with the grounds 
• Age and mobility demographics of the patrons 
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• Interest in the event 
• Fear 
• Anger 
• Surging and other unsafe behaviour 
 
Others relate specifically to the stadium, its location and its management: 
• Fire protection built into the stadium 
• Design and labelling of egress routes 
• Visibility 
• Tolerance of management and police to disruptive and destructive behaviour 
• Competency of staff with regards to the evacuation procedures 
• Availability of information to evacuees 
• Legal obligations/requirements 
• Weather 
• Smoking policy of stadium 
• The robustness of the evacuation procedures 
• Fire loading of suites and indoor areas 
• Occupancy of the stadia 
• Familiarity of the fire service with their local stadium 
• Ability of the fire service to reach the stadium quickly 
• Surrounding properties and associated hazards 
• Maintenance and housekeeping of the stadium 
 
3.2.1 USA 
To date the USA has had remarkably few stadium incidents of note. Those that stand 
out include a Texan stadium fire (on a non-event day), a Georgian stadium fire (prior to 
a game)20 and a fire that occurred during the 1934 reconstruction of Fenway Park21.  
 
The Texan stadium fire, at Texas Stadium, Irving, rapidly spread to affect two levels of 
corporate suites and seating in the main bowl.  
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The Georgian fire occurred in the press suites at Atlanta Fulton County Stadium on July 
20th, 1993 in Atlanta. This fire was started by an unattended open flame food-warming 
device. Investigators concluded that the device ignited some nearby combustible 
materials within the room. Interestingly the fire was not detected by stadium occupants. 
An off duty fire fighter watching the pre-game coverage on his television at home was 
the first to report the fire.  
 
The room of fire origin flashed over shortly after the fire service arrived. The entire 
press suite area and several private suites were affected. The fire was extinguished after 
an hour and the scheduled game went ahead only slightly delayed. The stadium was not 
hosting a capacity crowd and so potentially affected patrons were accommodated in 
other parts of the stadium. Although the disruption to the game was minimal repair costs 
and the potential injuries and disruption had the fire occurred during the game were still 
significant. 
 
The Fenway Park fire in Boston occurred on January 5th, 1934. Every appliance in 
Boston at the time attended this fire. The fire was caused by an overturned salamander. 
A canvas covering was accidentally ignited as workmen tried to dry fresh concrete with 
the salamander. The fire quickly spread to the bleachers and ended up destroying most 
of the stadium, which was then rebuilt. Although this fire effectively occurred in a 
construction site rather than a stadium it did demonstrate the potential for fire spread 
within the stadium. As many stadia are renovated in parts over several seasons the 
potential for fire spread from a construction zone remains a relevant consideration for 
stadium fire engineering design and egress management today. 
 
In none of these incidents was anyone other than fire fighters injured. The NFPA 
standards and code and other compliance documents played a part in the lack of 
injuries, the major contributing factor was that none of these events occurred during 
peak occupancy times. The Texan and Georgian fires occurred in parts of the stadium 
that were completely unoccupied, the fires being observed from other parts of the 
stadium. The Fenway Park fire occurred in the presence of workmen. The fire occurred 
outdoors. All onsite workmen were present at the ignition of the fire and were easily 
able to escape the fire off site. The impact of any of these fires, had more occupants 
been present, could have been much greater.  
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Although injuries were avoided, the damage that occurred as a result of these three fires 
was considerable. NFPA investigations into the Texan and Georgian fires concluded 
that the stadia would have suffered significantly less damage had their fire protection 
been brought up to the latest NFPA code requirements.  
 
As mentioned, none of these three fires occurred during peak occupancy. In New 
Zealand most stadia have the facilities to accommodate cricket, soccer, rugby, rugby 
league and in some cases hockey and athletics. Because stadia in the USA are largely 
designed to suit a specific sporting code, e.g. grid iron football, baseball, or athletics, 
without the same pressure to perform multiple functions, the frequency of use has 
differed considerably from some other countries. One of the largest stadia in the USA, 
Beaver Stadium held only six sporting events in 2002. This low usage rate greatly 
reduces the opportunity for a fire to occur during a peak occupancy period when 
compared to a New Zealand stadium which might accommodate twenty or more major 
sporting events per year as well as various other functions. Usage of Australian and 
British stadia is greater again. 
 
There are three NFPA publications in US building regulations that are concerned with 
stadia construction and safety. NFPA 101®: Life Safety Code®22, NFPA 102®: 
Standard for Grandstands, Folding and Telescopic Seating, Tents, and Membrane 
Structures23, and NFPA 5000™: Building Construction and Safety Code™24. None of 
these are used throughout the USA but they are the most commonly accepted across the 
country.   
 
NFPA 5000 covers design requirements of “Grandstands and Bleachers” in chapter 
32.7, identifying the allowable types of construction for these types of structure. It also 
lists the frequency of inspection and load bearing capacities but does not provide a great 
deal of detail specific to stadia. NFPA 102 does relate specifically to stadia, as opposed 
to the other documents, rather than considering many types of structure. NFPA 101 
again is concerned with a wide variety of structures and has specific sections and 
clauses that relate to stadia, bleachers and grandstands. 
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NFPA 102 is intended to provide life safety for occupants of assembly seating in 
relation to fire, storm, collapse and crowd behaviour. This standard provides general 
minimum requirements for stadium components but does not differentiate between 
different occupant loads or cover specific methods of achieving these requirements.  
 
NFPA101 applies a similar methodology to the Acceptable Solutions in the Approved 
Document for the New Zealand Building Code25. NFPA 101 provides the greatest 
amount of information and detail on the requirements of stadia construction and 
management to ensure life safety and fire protection. NFPA 101 details minimum 
acceptable requirements of structures for given occupancies and provides an appendix 
of explanatory materials and diagrams to assist in interpretation of the Life Safety Code.  
 
The Life Safety Code, as with the Approved Document for the New Zealand Building 
Code is only one method of achieving life safety and there is allowance for alternative 
solutions to be used so long as they are approved by the “authority having jurisdiction” 
and provide either equivalent or greater life safety than that required in the Life Safety 
Code. There are however two main differences; occupancies are divided into a greater 
number of types and life safety evaluations are required for certain structures, stadia 
included. The Life Safety Code provides more detailed guidelines than those of the 
other two NFPA documents, the Life Safety Code’s purpose being to address fire and 
safety issues particular to specific structures. For each structure type general and egress 
requirements as well as protection, special provisions, building services and operating 
features are described. Stadia and stadium components are covered in chapters 11-1326 
overlapping three of the 32 types of structure addressed in this Code. These chapters 
deal with special purpose, old and new assembly occupancies.  
 
The Life Safety Code has specific requirements for various components that comprise a 
stadium such as grandstands, telescopic seating, festival seating and bleachers. The 
Code specifies parameters for a range of occupancy numbers varying from 50 - 
>25,000. The parameters covered are very similar to those covered in C1 – Outbreak of 
Fire, C2 – Means of Escape, C3 – Spread of Fire, C4 – Structural Stability During Fire, 
F1 – Hazardous Agents on Site and F6 – Lighting for Emergency of the Approved 
Document for the New Zealand Building Code but are specific to assembly 
occupancies. 
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3.2.2 United Kingdom 
The UK - in contrast to the USA - has been subject to a significant number of stadium 
disasters as indicated in Table 1. Only one of the UK incidents listed in the table 
involved fire but they all identified failures within either the structure and/or 
management that led to problems in evacuation from the incident. A number of Acts of 
Parliament have subsequently been passed that pertain specifically to sports grounds 
including the Fire Safety and Places of Sport Act 198727. These Acts were brought 
about largely as a way to minimise the effects of football hooliganism but have much 
greater effect by addressing the issues of crowd management, evacuation, prevention of 
crowd crushes, and many other crowd safety issues that sporting and stadium events 
may produce. Local authorities issue annual certificates allowing stadia to operate but 
can also issue prohibition notices preventing stadia from operating if they develop 
safety concerns prior to the expiry of the current certificate. 
 
It should be noted that in Approved Document B for the UK Building Regulations 
200028 a stadium falls into the category of “Assembly and Recreation Type 5 purpose 
group”. As such it is not distinguished from other places of assembly – in this way it is 
the same as the Approved Document for the New Zealand Building Code. Where the 
UK requirements for stadia do differ is in that they have special compliance 
requirements above those of the building code that must be met in order for a stadium to 
pass its annual safety inspection. These documents cover such additional structural 
features as turnstiles, crush barrier placement of, and ramp slopes along with 
requirements of risk assessment and management practice. The compliance documents 
that address assembly areas such as stadia include BS 5588: Part 6: 1991 Code of 
Practice for Places of Assembly29, Guide to fire precautions in existing places of 
entertainment and like premises30, Safety of Sports Grounds Act 197531, Fire 
Precautions (Workplace) Regulations 199732, the Fire Precautions Act 197133 and the 
main one; the UK Guide to Safety at Sports Grounds 199834.  
 
One of the most significant UK incidents was the Bradford Stadium disaster on 11th 
May 198535. Although this had fewer casualties than the Hillsborough disaster in 198936 
it is by far the most dramatic stadium disaster in British history and had legislative 
repercussions37. The incident was dramatic for two reasons, firstly the entire incident 
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was televised and secondly the rapidity with which the fire developed and spread. The 
size of the fire and the images of people emerging from the stand with their clothing 
alight were broadcast around the UK and the world. This resulted in intense interest in 
the subsequent investigation and much public outcry, demanding that government 
ensure this sort of tragedy could not reoccur38. The result of the investigation was to 
introduce the Fire Safety and Safety of Places of Sport Act 1987 and the review of the 
Home Office Guide to Safety at Sports Grounds. This was republished as the UK Guide 
to Safety at Sports Grounds39 (1989) - commonly referred to as the Green Guide 
because of the colour of its cover.  
 
Sporting spectator tragedies were not unknown in the UK. Ibrox, for example had two 
deaths due to crushing in 1961 and a further 66 in 1971, the second of which led the 
Wheatley Report40 and subsequently the first edition of the Green Guide41. It was not 
until after the 1971 tragedy that stadia began to change their policies with regards to 
safety of patrons. 
 
The Green Guide was further developed in 1990 in response to the Hillsborough 
disaster42. This guide covers all aspects of event management at an event as well as 
design requirements for architects and engineers. It has been revised three times since 
its inception. The document itself has no power and is only a guide. The use of this 
guide is however a determining factor in the issuance of annual certificates of safety 
that are required for all football fields with a capacity to accommodate 5000 spectators 
or more and all other stadia and sporting facilities able to accommodate upwards of 
10,000 spectators43. It divides stadia into categories based on a range of criteria. 
Depending on the level of fire protection afforded a stand, acceptable evacuation time 
recommendations for individual stands range from 180 seconds through to 8 minutes44. 
The acceptable period is able to be increased if additional safety measures are added to 
the stadium operating manual. 
 
As mentioned previously, sports grounds including stadia in the UK require a current 
safety certificate. The Green Guide provides recommendations and instructions on how 
the structure should be designed and maintained, as well as how the grounds and events 
should be managed. Evacuation procedures fall under the umbrella of management and 
detailed guidance on acceptable practice is provided. Some of the information is 
- 25 - 
 
common sense, some historic practice, some occupational safety and health, and some 
based on research in such fields as pedestrian movement, crowd control, crowd 
psychology, structural engineering and fire engineering. Strict adherence to the Green 
Guide and an increase in police powers to deal with hooliganism over the past few years 
has markedly reduced the UK’s stadium incidents45. 
3.2.3 Australia 
The Australian Building Code (BCA)46 classes stadia as “open spectator stands” in 
clause C1.7 and as such they may be constructed as Type C construction (for simple 
stands with one tier of seating) or Type A construction (for more complex structures) 
subject to concessions outlined in Table 3 of Specification C1.147. BCA96 does not 
make special considerations for special purpose buildings such as stadia. In the case of 
the Olympic Stadium, fire modelling illustrated that the deemed to satisfy egress 
requirements were insufficient and hence larger egress areas were designed48. In the 
case of at least four of the newest Australian stadia the UK Green Guide has been 
considered in the design of the structures49.  
 
In 1998 Bennetts et al50 of the Centre for Environmental Safety and Risk Engineering at 
Victoria University of Technology published a report exploring the implications of the 
“deemed to satisfy” requirements of the BCA for Type A construction stadia. The report 
provides guidance on considerations that should be made based on issues that have 
arisen historically in stadia and have the potential to impact on the performance of fire 
safety aspects of fire engineering for this type of construction. It highlights a number of 
issues that are peculiar to stadia and grandstands. These include the size of the 
evacuating crowd and potential impedance on fire-fighters ability to set up 
expeditiously. It does not, however, provide an opinion or assessment as to whether the 
BCA adequately addresses these concerns within the requirements for Type A 
construction. 
 
The most memorable Australian stadium fire in recent history occurred in August 1999 
when the MCG scoreboard caught fire51. The fire occurred on the 27th of August just as 
the players were entering the field for an AFL match between the Carlton Tigers and 
Richmond. One of the major hazards during this fire was when flaming pieces of 
scoreboard fell away and carried by the wind, drifted onto the top deck of the nearby the 
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Ponsford Stand. This had the potential to become a significant source of fire spread and 
injury but was quickly brought under control by prompt and effective response efforts 
of staff and fire service. The city end of the grounds where that scoreboard was located 
was immediately evacuated, the fire extinguished and twenty five minutes later the 
game commenced. Nobody was injured during the fire but the video scoreboard was 
severely damaged making the cost of the fire in the order of $10,000,000 including the 
cost of replacement screen and installation.  
 
Other than severely damaging the scoreboard no damage or injuries resulted from the 
fire. The incident did however raise concerns about evacuation and crowd management 
for an event especially in relation to ticketing areas52. Ticketing areas were a problem in 
that people exiting from the area were noticeably slowed. The MCG now has 
comprehensive emergency procedures and advises other stadia on how to prepare 
emergency plans53. 
3.2.4 New Zealand 
Requirements with respect to egress and evacuations are laid out in the Fire Safety and 
Evacuation of Buildings Regulations 199254. Stadia as facilities that accommodate 
greater than 100 people in a common gathering place require an evacuation scheme. 
Requirements with respect to fire protection and means of escape are laid out in the 
New Zealand Building Regulations 199255.  
 
New Zealand has over the past 12 years had 909 fires at stadia, grandstands and sports 
fields that were responded to by the fire service (Appendix D). Of these incidents an 
unknown amount occurred at the major sports stadia (those with spectator capacities of 
≥ 20,000) (Appendices C, D).  
 
Remarkably few published studies are available on New Zealand stadia. Most of the 
information that was readily obtained through studies of overseas stadia had to be 
obtained through interviews and internal records of stadia and fire service 
communications for New Zealand stadia.  
 
Many fires and false alarms have occurred at large stadia in New Zealand but none have 
resulted in injury or major damage (Appendices C, D). Of those fires and false alarms 
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occurring during scheduled events, one of the most interesting of these was at North 
Harbour Stadium, on 29th of August 199856. In this instance no fire occurred but a 
sprinkler above a deep fryer activated. This activation did not trigger the evacuation 
alarms to automatically sound. The alarms were manually activated some sixteen 
minutes later57. At this point evacuation of the entire complex was initiated. Shortly 
after that, the public address system was used by the attending fire service to advise 
patrons that there was no fire and they could remain in their seats. This caused a level of 
confusion amongst both patrons and staff, bringing to light issues that needed to be 
addressed in the evacuation procedures for that stadium58. Subsequently, North Harbour 
Stadium has placed a strong emphasis on evacuation procedures and was the first major 
stadium in New Zealand to achieve an approved fire safety evacuation plan. 59,60 
 
Other fire related incidents of note in New Zealand have occurred at Eden Park 
(scoreboard fire)61 and Carisbrook (Figure 4) where numerous fires have been set over 
the years by spectators on the terraces62. The fires at Carisbrook were peculiar to that 
stadium in that spectators were for a time allowed to bring furniture, such as couches, 
into the terrace area to watch sporting events. Occasionally, particularly when it was 
cold, some of these items of furniture were deliberately set alight by the spectators. The 
record number of fires on the terraces occurred in 1998 with 30 being set in one day. 
Management at Carisbrook banned the practice of bringing furniture into the grounds in 
1999 because of persistent fire lighters.63 The Dunedin City Council liquor licensing co-
ordinator has stated that the potential for lighting fires was one of the reasons that 
plastic and paper cups have not replaced cans for beer sales at Carisbrook64. Despite 
efforts to stop the practice through minimising fuel sources and through prosecutions, 
fire lighting continues to occur at Carisbrook on occasion. 
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Figure 4 “Atmosphere heats up...Smoke from one of several small fires lit on the terraces wafts across the 
crowd.”65 
The Approved Document for the New Zealand Building Code 2000 makes little 
mention of stadia. It lists an occupant density of 1.8 users/m2 for stadia and 
grandstands66, and 2.2 users per linear metre for bleachers and bench seating67. The 
Document addresses components of stadia but does not consider the stadium entity as a 
whole, in the same way that the BCA does in Australia. Grandstands are classed as CL 
(crowd occupancy with an occupant load exceeding 100) or CO (crowd occupancy 
space for viewing open air activities) purpose groups68 with areas such as the concourse 
possibly falling into the CM purpose group69. The fire hazard categories (FHC) for 
these purpose groups is 1 or 2 depending on the fire load energy density (FLED)70. 
There are of course other purpose groups that apply to specific fire cells within the 
stadium such as basement car parks and kitchens; however the majority of the structure 
consists of the arena seating, the concourse and the suite and lounge areas. These 
firecells are limited in size to 5000 m2 for unsprinklered fire cells of FHC 1 and 2500 
m2 for FHC 271. In theory this should limit the fire load to 2,000,000MJ in 
unsprinklered fire cells. There is no floor area limit for sprinklered fire cells. Based on 
communications and stadium visits, most New Zealand stadia have sprinklered all of 
their internal areas and many of the unenclosed areas. However, some of the older 
stadia have not yet upgraded all of their facilities and some large, furnished, 
unsprinklered fire cells remain.  
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3.3 Human and Crowd Behaviour 
Human behaviour is difficult to predict and many variables affect it. In developing 
evacuation procedures and planning structural design that facilitates effective 
evacuation for specific population types or sizes it is important to consider the variables 
that are most likely to influence that population. With stadia, crowd dynamics play a 
major role in effective evacuation so it is important to understand the basic profile 
characteristics of the crowds that will patronise the stadium under consideration.  
 
The most obvious and stereotypical example of stadium crowd behaviour is British 
soccer fans. British soccer fans have an international reputation for drunken, disorderly 
behaviour and starting fights72. For this reason a soccer stadium may be designed with 
many segregated areas in order to limit the number of patrons that would be affected by 
a disorderly incident or preventing disruption to the pitch73. This has a flow on effect to 
egress layouts, safe egress times and response times for reaching and controlling an 
incident. These can be calculated using access tree diagrams74 to determine the required 
safe egress time (RSET) but to quote Sime; - “The one component of RSET namely 
human behaviour is the one that poses the problem”75. It has long been recognised that 
even stadia hosting events of a common ilk may experience widely different crowd 
behaviour76. 
 
In the same way that stadia holding paraplegic games have specific features to facilitate 
the mobility profile of their patrons, all stadia must be designed considering the 
psychological profile and movement patterns of their typical patrons. One obvious 
difference in the crowd composition for a stadium crowd profile versus an office 
building crowd profile is the influence of alcohol. The proportion of the population that 
is to some degree under the influence of alcohol at a stadium event is significantly 
higher than might be expected for an office building. This is due to stadium events 
having a social context where alcohol consumption is often an accepted part of the 
associated social ritual, unlike a workplace, where it is not. As such, alcohol plays a 
larger role in defining the profile of the evacuating crowd and potential sources of fire. 
This was illustrated in the Carisbrook management decision to not introduce disposable 
cups or plastic bottles for alcohol sales77. 
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Destructive behaviour whilst uncommon is in general, far more likely to occur with a 
stadium or entertainment type of crowd than it is amongst most other crowd 
populations78. An example of this was the June 23, 1968 incident in Buenos Aires 
where 73 people died from crushing injuries as pressure built up against a closed exit 
door (door 12)79. Patrons were leaving after a soccer match between River Plate and 
Boca Juniors when youths began throwing burning newspaper into the crowd from an 
overhead terrace. This resulted in a stampede as people attempted to escape the flaming 
missiles. Unfortunately a large part of the fleeing crowd headed towards a closed door 
and with no front to back communication, crushing injuries and deaths occurred. In 
addition to those people crushed against doors, patrons in the stairwell were also 
injured. Descending patrons increased their movement rate attempting to flee. This led 
to crushing injuries in the stairwells beneath the youths as well. 
3.3.1 Flow Rates 
Much work has been done in the study of sports spectator crowds, possibly because of 
the frequency with which soccer crowds have been involved in mass casualty incidents. 
One such study, by Poyner, et al80 included flow rate measurements of the egressing 
crowd. In their study flow rates were measured for a period of twenty minutes, starting 
ten minutes before the final whistle and continuing for ten minutes after the final 
whistle. The study was conducted at eleven stadia but only three had sufficient lighting 
for egress to be filmed and accurately analysed (results from these three stadia are 
discussed below). Poyner et al state that the results obtained by head counting at the 
stadia were not as accurate as those obtained from reviewing film footage; hence only 
three of the data sets are reliable. It should be noted that this study was not looking at 
emergency egress but at normal flows.  
 
All of Poyner et al’s results were obtained by viewing patrons leaving at the end of 
football games. Due to poor lighting conditions and the technology of the time most of 
the videoed egresses were unsuitable for analysis. As a low yield of reliable data was 
produced, this information in isolation is of limited value. It does provide an interesting 
comparison to flow rates obtained by other researchers in other types of buildings, as 
well as rates obtained in the course of this research from video footage of patrons 
leaving rugby football games in New Zealand and Australia. 
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The results of Poyner’s monitoring showed a maximum flow rate of 118 people per 
minute, achieved across exit ways within a minute of the final whistle81. This indicated 
an unimpeded flow rate of 1.9 people per metre per second. The flow rate rapidly 
declined to a specific steady state flow rate of 1.4 people per metre per second. This rate 
was maintained for 5 minutes, followed by a similar rapid drop off over the following 
two minutes and all flow ceased after 18 minutes. During the 18 minutes of egress some 
1200 people passed through the 2 metre wide gates being monitored. As Poyner et al 
only studied the final exits they did not make any observations regarding bottle-necks or 
comparisons of flow rates on stairs, ramps or terraces. It is assumed (although not 
stated) that all of the exits studied were flat terrain on a straight path. 
 
Other studies observing different types of crowds have produced different rates to those 
observed by Poyner et al. A comparison of some of these is shown in table 2 and figure 
5 on the following pages. 
 
Studies reviewed were conducted by a number of researchers looking at different crowd 
populations in different countries. Not all studies were concerned with flow rate and 
density relationships. A summary of flow rates from some of these studies is shown in 
Table 1 and Figures 2 and 3.  
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Table 2: Crowd Flow Studies 
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Figure 5: Flow Rates on walkways 
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Figure 6: Flow Rates on stairwells 
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It is noticeable from the charts that there are distinct differences amongst the various 
calculation methods and observations. This is not unusual and is to be expected, as 
people do not always behave in the same way. The differences are possibly indicative of 
different crowds exhibiting different behaviour patterns. All are based on observational 
data and therefore valid. It is pure speculation as to the source of these behavioural 
differences as the studies do not make assertions as to psychological inputs that may 
have contributed to the flow rates. 
 
Fruin describes six different “levels of service”87. Those displayed in the previous charts 
and table correspond to levels E and F, “congested stairs and walkways”. These are 
recommended for determining egress paths for emergency movement and limited space 
situations. Fruin’s flow rates increase and then flat-line once a critical density is 
reached. The density impedes speed above the critical density but not to the point where 
flow rates decline through stagnation of movement. 
 
Fruin’s research was published some months earlier than Poyner’s and looked at crowd 
flow on a number of different terrains or “levels of service”. Fruin quotes seven people 
per square metre as sufficient density for the crowd to act as a fluid, propagating 
shockwaves88. He describes this concentration of people as preventing any individual 
action. This density can result in people fainting from heat, anxiety and pressure. There 
is no way for individuals to help those who fall and their injuries can be severe89.  
 
Pauls and Predtechenskii, in contrast to Fruin, both observed optimum flow rates with 
flow rates decreasing above the critical density. Pauls’ critical density for stairwells is 
similar to Predtechenskii’s but the flow rate achieved is notably higher. Pauls flow rate 
at critical density is 0.94 people per metre width second whereas Predtechenskii’s is 
0.67. This equates to a flow rate 1.4 times that observed by Predtechenskii. 
 
Nelson and MacLennan90 list a maximum specific flow for corridors, aisles, ramps and 
doorways of 1.3 people per second per metre effective width. This is lower than that 
given by Fruin or that observed in SCICON91. It is of note that the maximum specific 
flow obtained using Simulex peaks at a lower density than that of the other authors with 
unimpeded walking speed range from 0.8-1.7m/s. Fruin by contrast recorded average 
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walking speeds of 0.51-1.27m/s. This maximum speed is achieved in unimpeded flow 
that is, with a density less than 3.8 people/m2 Nelson and MacLennan or 2.2 people/m2 
92. 
 
With all of these varying recommendations and results which ones have become 
standard practices for estimating flows at stadia? It appears that there is little conformity 
between nations. Different nations have adopted recommendations based on research 
performed on crowds in their countries. No literature could be found that identified how 
the different nations selected the rates they adopted with the exception of the UK, where 
the SCICON study was commissioned specifically for the purpose of establishing flow 
rates at stadia93. 
 
The following chart outlines maximum walking flow rates that have been adopted in 
various different countries: 
 
Source Country Rate 
Fruin USA 1.4 
Puskarev USA 1.4 
Brilon Germany 1.6 
Tanaboriboon & Guyano Thailand 1.7 
Green Guide UK 1.8 
Table 3: Internationally Recommended Flow Rates94
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US calculations anticipate an evacuation to take 29% longer than UK 
caclulations. After five minutes there is a 120 person cumulative 
difference between US and UK recommended flow estimations at a 
given point along a two metre wide path.
 
Figure 7: Cumulative Flow Calculation Comparisons
 




Occupants may desire to evacuate a structure quickly, but may have difficulty finding 
their way out95. This may be due to visual obscuration, physical barriers, disorientation 
or lack of familiarity with the building. Regardless of these factors there are two other 
obstacles the occupants must overcome. These are the influence of others and an innate 
desire to egress along their ingress route96. 
 
Using video footage from surveillance videos in public buildings, Proulx97 observed that 
the most common response to an alarm is to ignore it as “just another false alarm.” As 
some individuals ignore the alarm a passive, psychological pressure to conform to the 
group delays other individuals from evacuating or alerting others. They do this in order 
to avoid mistakenly causing a scene having adopted the assumption that if it was an 
actual alarm everyone else would not be ignoring it. Proulx also observed that people 
tend to exit via the door they entered, often ignoring fire exits along their egress route. 
Proulx further observed that there was a tendency to complete activities prior to leaving 
the building - even in the presence of smoke.  Proulx is not alone in observing this type 
of behaviour. Although this study was conducted in real fire situations a number of 
studies of this behaviour under simulated conditions have also been conducted. Latane 
and Darley98 observed this type of behaviour in experiments in the 1960s.  
 
The repercussions of such behaviour can be significant. The delay in movement may 
make wayfinding more difficult as smoke and fire cut off routes and diminish the 
senses. As a fire develops the danger to people becomes greater and in extreme cases 
may be sufficient to prevent people from successfully egressing from an affected 
structure. The most notable example of such behaviour in stadium crowds occurred at 
Bradford Football Stadium in 1985 where people unnecessarily delayed moving away 
from the fire affected stand99. As a consequence many casualties resulted. 
 
3.3.3 Crowd Density 
Crowd density is well recognised as a major factor in determining the speed of an 
evacuation and hence egress routes are designed so as to accommodate the egressing 
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population without the crowd density exceeding the predetermined limit. This is for the 
large part strictly a numbers game. The influence of the crowd dynamics is often 
ignored100.  
 
Psychologists describe human interaction within a crowd as a collection of “cells”101. 
Small groups of individuals make up a cell. These individuals have limited 
communication with each other regardless of whether they know each other or not. The 
cells overlap one another and a collection of these cells make up a crowd (figure 8). 
Individuals may be members of several cells at a given time but they are not able to 
communicate with cells they are not currently a part of. This is most obvious in 
situations where poor front to back communication leads to crushing injuries102. People 
on the outer edges of the crowd are less densely packed and are unaware of the 
conditions further in. Individuals on the outer edges can act independently of the crowd 




Figure 8 - Overlapping cells within a crowd 
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The crowd goes through phases as the density increases. Initially the crowd behaves like 
a gas where the molecules, or in this case cells are constantly changing. Cells can 
absorb shockwaves and can compress or expand as physical boundaries and obstacles 
are encountered. Then as the density increases further, groups of cells compress to the 
point where they condense and act as a fluid. Fruin104 suggests seven people per square 
metre as the required density for this to occur.  Fruin uses different densities to quantify 
the level of service available to individuals. Level of Service A is free motion 
uninhibited by other people. Level F is when only shuffling motion is possible because 
of the lack of space around a person. Fruin’s levels of service and the size of a person 
within his model are illustrated in the following figure.  
 
 
Figure 9 Fruin's Levels of Service 
Analysis of video footage of the Hillsborough disaster illustrated how Fruin’s model 
falls over when applied to stadia105. The footage showed movement of the order of 
1.3m/s (4.7km/hr) at densities consistent with Level of Service E (0.78 m2 per person). 
Fruin suggests that at this density only restricted motion is possible. 
 
In the “fluid” phase the cells are fairly constant in their composition. Cells can no longer 
absorb shockwaves. Ripples can be sent through the crowd. As with any liquid it is 
virtually incompressible. People at the back of the crowd may perceive the compression 
Level of Service B: 3.25m2 
 Level of Service C: 2.32m2 
Level of Service D: 1.39 m2 
 
 
Level of Service E: 0.93m2 
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of cells from “gas” to “fluid” as forward movement and hence push forward, further 
exasperating the situation. In this type of situation security often identifies the problem 
at the front and advises those people at the front not to push, when in fact they are 
incapable of independent motion and it is the gentle jostling at the back that is actually 
causing the problem106. 
 
The crowd densities that produce fluid type behaviour are best avoided, hence, they do 
not occur except under rare and extreme conditions. Fruin describes these in terms of 
force, information, space and time (FIST). There are five environments that result in this 
type of crowd density. 
 
3.3.4 Flight  
In a bid to escape from danger, a crowd may attempt to move faster than it is able to 
crushing those in front. This type of behaviour was exhibited in Buenos Aires in 1968 
when hooligans threw wads of burning paper down into packed stairwells107. It has also 
been observed in stadia at the onset of hail storms and heavy rain108. 
 
3.3.5 Surging or Craze  
The opposite of flight behaviour. The crowd rushes towards something causing the front 
of the crowd to surge forward, much as a wave builds as it approaches land. This 
predominantly occurs in festival seating arrangements109. This is unlikely to occur in a 
fire situation. 
 
3.3.6 Interruption of flow  
Where a walkway narrows producing a bottle-neck the crowd is unable to maintain 
speed crushing those near the front110. This occurred at a stadium’s ticket stiles prior to 
a game in New Zealand in 2002. Pressure was relieved by opening egress gates to allow 
unimpeded ingress. 
 
- 42 - 
 
3.3.7 Blockage of flow  
An extreme version of interruption of flow where no flow is possible. This typically 
occurs when doors are blocked or they open into the crowd. Crash or crush doors are 
designed to avoid this situation, “crashing” open when a critical “crush” pressure is 
applied to the opening mechanism. Illegally locked gates were involved in a number of 
the crushing incidents mentioned in Table 1 and have been the cause of crushing 
injuries and deaths in many structure fires over the years111. 
 
3.3.8 Crossed flow  
Unlike the other four situations this results in the people in the middle of the crowd 
being exposed to the greatest pressure. Crossed flow occurs when part of the crowd 
changes direction or multiple flows fail to merge successfully. Crossed flow has the 
potential for the greatest incidence of injury as pressure is applied from different 
directions making it more difficult to maintain balance or “ride the wave”. Moscow’s 
Lenin Stadium (1982), Hillsborough112 (1989) and the Ibrox incident113 (1971) all 
resulted from crowds changing direction. Areas where poor merging occurs are often 
identifiable during normal egress situations and can be addressed preventing major 
incidents from occurring. 
 
3.4 Coordination/management 
Coordination and management of a stadium crowd is different to that of an office 
building. As a place of entertainment the crowd is more social and potentially less 
compliant than that of an office building or a hotel might be. This can be due to a 
number of factors, the increased likelihood of members of the crowd to “egg on” an 
individual who is confronting authority114, greater dissociation from self into a mass 
mentality, increased annoyance at having an enjoyable activity interrupted and the 
higher incidence of the influence of alcohol amongst crowd members. 
 
In USA stadia, like many other countries, alcohol is provided for patrons to purchase. 
However the in the USA low alcohol beer is the norm at such venues, reducing the 
potential for drunken behaviour. College stadia, which make up a large proportion of 
the largest stadia in the USA may not provide any alcohol if they are part of a dry 
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campus. The USA is also different in that due to low labour costs it is more viable for 
alcohol to be provided in cups. This limits the quantity that an individual is able to carry 
thereby reducing the level of consumption. This is not the case in other countries.  
 
In the UK control of alcohol at stadia was only introduced after the Bradford 
disaster115.For the most part alcohol consumption is not a problem for stadium 
management but in certain circumstances it has the potential to make crowd behaviour 
disruptive and or more difficult to manage or coordinate. Many studies of response time 
and reasoning impairment have shown that inebriated individuals are less responsive 
than sober individuals. Several incidents that have developed into disasters at stadia 
have been instigated by drunken individuals. For these reasons the potential for alcohol 
consumption to affect egress management and crowd movement in emergency 
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4 Experimental Method 
The experimental part of this study was designed to gather information about actual 
crowd movement and levels of fire protection in New Zealand stadia. From this it was 
anticipated that it could be determined whether crowd movement at New Zealand 
stadia is consistent with that of other researchers and that suggested by standard texts 
such as the SFPE Handbook of Fire Protection Engineering116. Information about the 
level of fire protection in New Zealand stadia and stadia in Australia was gathered so 
as to assess whether there were any major differences in the protection afforded 
stadium structures in New Zealand as compared with other countries. 
 
• Observational experimental data was collected in two ways: 
⋅ Interviews or survey sheets with stadium management and persons related 
to managing egress and/or fire service liaison at the various stadia 
⋅  Video footage of egressing crowd movement at stadium events 
 
• Egress simulation data was obtained using Simulex evacuation software and 
CAD drawings of stadia or sections of stadia. 
 
• Hand calculations were performed using formulae from Section 3 Chapter 14 
Emergency Movement of the SFPE Handbook 3rd ed.117 
 
• Comparisons of emergency movement data from video footage, simulation 
output and hand calculations were then made. 
4.1 Personal Correspondence 
Interviews were conducted with stadium operations and security management, fire 
safety officers and fire service personnel associated with the various stadia. A copy of 
the interview questions and the individuals that were interviewed is included in 
Appendix B. Interviews were used to obtain information on how crowd egress was 
managed, the fire protection methods used at the venue and problems that had been 
encountered, anticipated or overcome. 
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4.2 Observing Stadium Egress 
4.2.1 Crowd Movement 
Of the stadia visited, an initial survey of the stadium was conducted and suitable 
locations to record egress were identified. These locations were chosen based on 
information from stadium staff about their experience with egress flow around the 
grounds. Those sites that had potential visibility problems, would interfere with egress 
flow or did not have obvious landmarks to measure against were dismissed. The 
remaining sites were measured across the width of the egress path. Where possible, 
distances between landmarks along the egress paths were also measured. These 
measurements were taken in order to allow video footage to be later analysed for: 
 
• Speed of flow 
• Density of flow 
• Flow rate 
 
In some cases additional areas were identified as unusual during the egress. Where 
these were videoed measurements were taken after the egress had ceased. 
 
The majority of video footage was recorded at the end of “Super 12 Competition” 
rugby games. Recording started shortly before the end of games and a verbal cue was 
recorded upon hearing the final whistle that ended the game. Where the final whistle 
was not used as a cue the actual time as recorded by the video camera was used to 
provide starting and finishing times for sequences. Recording was stopped either 
when crowd density dropped to the point where other patrons did not impede 
movement or when no further patrons were using the egress path.  
 
Video footage of vomitories and concourse areas around food vendors was obtained at 
half time or prior to the game only where crowd densities were sufficient to be of 
interest.  
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Due to the liquor licensing arrangements at stadia in New Zealand, it was not practical 
to collect observational data for comparison from corporate or lounge areas. These 
areas remained populated after the end of the game, and continued to be occupied 
until they were closed. 
 
4.2.2 Individuals within the crowd 
In some cases the time taken for an individual to traverse a known distance was 
recorded. In densely packed crowds this was only possible with individuals who stood 
out from others, primarily by wearing an unusual, large or brightly coloured article of 
clothing. Attempts were made to record similar footage of mobility impaired 
individuals however opportunities for this were limited. Where viewing access was 
suitable families or groups within the crowd were identified and their interaction with 
the greater crowd was noted. Verbal cues recorded on the video footage identified 
these individuals or groups for later analysis. 
 
Video footage was obtained using a single digital video camera. Consequently it was 
not possible to obtain data from all areas of the various grounds. Total evacuation 
times were estimated from observations of the control room surveillance cameras or 
observations taken within the grounds. 
4.2.3 Video Analysis 
Video footage was analysed using the eyeball technique. Although this is not difficult 
it is arduous and must be repeated for each set of data that is collected in a given 
sequence. Footage was transferred to computer. Footage was edited to start at the time 
of the final whistle (or other cue). The time since the initial cue and the number of 
patrons to pass the preassigned landmarks were then recorded by hand while viewing 
the video footage. Where individuals or groups were identified as being of interest, 
the time taken for them to traverse a known distance was recorded and compared to 
that of other presumably unrelated members of the crowd. Playback was viewed using 
frame advance and counts were taken every 1 second of recording. Not all video 
footage collected was suitable for analysis. 
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Figure 10 illustrates the following examples of observational analysis.  
4.2.3.1 Flow Rates 
All of the individuals whose heads have been marked with a black dot passed arrow A 
within a 1 second increment. The width of the walkway was measured. This analysis 
technique provides data in terms of specific flow (people per time per effective 
width).  
4.2.3.2 Speed 
The man in the striped jersey and cap to the left of the diagram (oval) has just passed 
the mark in the join on the concrete (arrow A). The time taken from him reaching this 
mark until his head drops when he reaches arrow B indicates the time it takes for him 
to reach the top of the stairs. As the distance between arrows A and B is known his 
speed can be calculated. 
4.2.3.3 Density 
The crowd density can be established by counting the total number of heads between 
the dotted lines marking arrows A and B in a given frame. 
 
Figure 10: Observational Method 
A 
B 
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4.3 Calculations 
A selection of calculations found in Section 3 Chapter 14 of the SFPE Handbook 3rd 
ed.118 were used to perform hand calculations on sections of egress paths at different 
stadia. 
4.3.1 Premovement Time: 
Assumptions were made in order to justify the use of egress footage at the end of a 
game as an approximation of emergency movement. The most significant assumption 
is that there is no premovement time at the end of a game.  
 
Evacuation times are a way of gauging the speed with which occupancies empty. This 
information is gathered routinely during evacuation trials and data from actual 
emergency evacuations. From these studies it has been found that there are four main 
determinants in evacuation times; premovement activity, speed of evacuees, distance 
to safety and density of the crowd, all other variables affect one of these four 
determinants. For example, poor visibility affects speed and possibly premovement, 
obstacles and uneven terrain can affect speed, density and distance, obviously 
detectable danger such as visible smoke may affect premovement, speed and density. 
Speed, distance and density are not independent of each other either. If, as in the case 
of a high rise building there is significant distance to traverse to a point of safety 
people become tired and speed decreases. Similarly if the front of the crowd is 
moving more slowly than the back of the crowd the density will increase.  
 
The information from crowd movement is then compared to the speed with which a 
danger, such as a fire spread, could develop in the occupancy to determine whether 
the occupant’s could/should/did evacuate rapidly enough to avoid injury. This 
determines the “required safe egress time” to complete an evacuation (RSET) and the 
“available safe egress time” before conditions become untenable (ASET). RSET is the 
time required to evacuate the building based on occupancy levels and egress path 
distances. ASET is the time available to perform an evacuation before the egress path 
is likely to be compromised by untenable conditions. ASET can be increased by 
increasing the fire protection of an occupancy and should always be greater than 
RSET. 
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RSET is a sum of the various time increments required to perform evacuation tasks 
from the time of fire ignition until the evacuation is complete. This can be 
summarised as: 
mpmade ttttt +++=       Equation 1119 
where et = time to evacuate, dt = time from ignition to detection, at = time from 
detection to notification, pmt = premovement time and mt = movement time.  
 
Observations of the end of rugby games were assumed to have dt , at , pmt =0, 
therefore me tt = , with mt commencing when the referee blows his whistle for full 
time. Simulations and calculations that are compared against observational data 
therefore have also assumed me tt = . 
 
This assumption is based on the following: 
 
• the majority of occupants have no reason to stay after the game 
• patrons are with their associates and have all their possessions in hand 
• patrons are anticipating the referee’s whistle 
• many patrons attempt to “beat the rush” and leave as promptly as possible 
• weather conditions during rugby season are often such that people are in a 
hurry to get somewhere warm 
• queuing times absorb any delay to evacuate by slow to respond patrons  
 
The assumption of no premovement time would be invalid during an actual fire 
evacuation. Premovement time has been ignored in this case only to simplify the 
acquisition and application of observational data.  
 
In the event of a fire alarm sounding the premovement time would be greater. While 
weather conditions and having possessions in hand may be common to both 
situations, patrons are not anticipating a fire alarm and if the game is still in play they 
are not likely to be keen to leave. Similarly patrons may assume that a fire alarm is a 
false alarm and therefore only a temporary interruption. In this case there may be no 
- 50 - 
 
initial motivation to evacuate unless obvious signs of fire can be observed. If the game 
continues despite the alarm, patrons may decide not to leave, obstructing others and 
slowing down the evacuation. Of even greater concern, should something sensational, 
happen during the evacuation some patrons may try to return to the arena against the 
flow of the crowd resulting in crush injuries to those evacuees in the middle of the 
crowd. This was typified by crowd movement at the 1971 Ibrox incident120 when 
members of the crowd tried to rush back into the arena. 
 
4.3.2 Effective width 
It is commonly recognised that people do not use the full width of a pathway. They 
maintain a boundary layer between themselves and stationary obstacles. 
 
Effective width (We) = clear width – width of boundary layers  Equation 2 
 
Boundary layer widths were selected from those recommended in the SFPE handbook 
page 3-369121.  
 
Element Boundary Layer 
Obstacle such as bollard, column or 
rubbish bin 
10cm 
Walls bordering concourses, passageways 
and vomitories 
46cm 
Walls bordering corridors, ramps sand 
stairs 
15 cm 
Table 4: Boundary Layers 
4.3.3 Speed 
Speed is determined to be a function of occupant density and speed factor, k, which is 
determined by the slope of the surface between densities of 0.54 and 3.8 people/ m2. 
This can be expressed as:  
 
- 51 - 
 
akDkS −=       Equation 3 
 
where a= 0.266. k = constants reflective of the established maximum speed for 
studied terrains (for flat surfaces using Fruin’s data k=1.40122). Density is assumed to 
be optimum when maximum specific flow is achieved, and is taken as 1.9 people per 
metre squared of exit route space. This is interpolated from the specific flow - density 
relationship outlined in the SFPE Handbook123 and deriving the maximum density 
from the formula for specific flow as shown in the following equations, Equation 4, 5. 
4.3.3 Specific Flow and Calculated Flow 
Specific flow (Fs) is a measure of evacuating persons past a given point as a function 
of speed (S) and density (D). 
SDFs =       Equation 4 














    Equation 5 
Optimum density is therefore dependant on a. As a is independent of the type of 
egress, e.g. stairs, concourse, etc specific flow should be maximised at this density for 
all types of egress. 
 
Calculated flow (Fc) is the flow predicted for a given point as a function of specific 
flow and effective width. 
esc WFF =       Equation 6 
Calculated flow predicts the maximum capacity that can be achieved through an 
egress path. 
4.3.4 Varying k 
Estimates of evacuation flows and densities using a combination of observational data 
and established research were also calculated for comparison with the observed data 
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using equation 4 and its derivative equation, equation 3, relating speed in terms of 
densities and constants based on terrain. 
 
As mentioned previously, k = constants reflective of the established maximum speed 
for studied terrains. A table of values reflective of Fruin’s work can be found in 
Chapter14 of the 3rd edition of the SFPE Handbook124. A value of k=1.8 was used in 
order to establish values based on Poyner’s work. 
 
4.3.5 Estimated Egress Times (time for passage) 
Assuming that the gate, stair or pathway that was monitored was representative of all 
egress from the stadium and that in an evacuation the maximum Fs were maintained 
once it was reached estimates of the potential minimum egress times through the 
monitored point could be extrapolated to provide values for the total stadium. It would 
be unlikely for the extrapolated values to be accurate as few stadia were laid out 
symmetrically and certain exits are used preferentially based on external incentives 
such as proximity to public transport. It must be stressed that these values only 
provide a best estimate based on the collected data and should not be used as a 
definitive method of calculating stadium egress potential.  
 
The formulae used for estimating egress times for a population (P) are referred to as 
time for passage (tp) in the SFPE Handbook125. Time for passage calculations were 
made once maximum Fs was reached. 
c
p F
Pt =       Equation 7 






=      Equation 8 
 
A table of the spreadsheet calculations performed on observational data can be found 
in the results section. Actual results from the spreadsheet are located in Appendix E. 
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4.4 Computer simulations 
A number of computer programs are available that facilitate the simulation of 
evacuations with inputs for premovement (or delayed evacuation), speed, density and 
distance. The problem with simulations is that despite the convenience, people and 
crowds do not always behave with the response that the model predicts. Many models 
are based on the flow of objects such as ball bearings or traffic. One of the main 
problems with these models is that movement occurs in one direction independent of 
other individuals. Conversely within even dense crowds small groups will fight 
against the crowd to maintain contact or protect weaker individuals within their group. 
Direction of motion available to humans (as opposed to simulations) is 
multidirectional within all but very dense crowds. Humans are able to reverse, 
sidestep, travel against the crowd, faster than the crowd or take unusual paths such as 
sliding down stair rails to bypass others. This is done through altering personal space, 
varying pace, pushing, communication with others and taking advantage of variations 
in the crowd movement around them. These movement patterns can in some instances 
affect the general crowd flow but they are difficult to model and are not considered by 
simulation software. 
 
In predicting crowd movement it must be recognised that a crowd is not a mindless 
mass. Although it may act with one overriding personality, individuals within the 
crowd are constantly making decisions that affect that personality. Examples observed 
during this study included variations between different sporting crowds and based on 
the location and accessibility of the stadia. At some stadia it was observed that 
although people entered the stadium from all entrances, the majority of them 
attempted to leave through only one or two exits, rather than exiting the way they 
entered. The reason for this was people had gone from work to the stadium using a 
wide range of transport and were going from the stadium to town or to home via the 
local public transport depot. Similarly it was recognised by stadium staff and 
observation that there were often blockages to egress at the base of light poles or by 
feature objects such as inflatable advertisements where people had arranged to meet. 
During an evacuation it must be recognised that while people’s prime motivation 
should be to escape danger other considerations will also be affecting their movement. 
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4.4.1 Egress Simulation 
One way of testing the efficacy of a structural design for evacuation purposes is to run 
computer simulations. There are several advantages to running a simulation as 
opposed to a trial evacuation: 
 
• A simulation can be performed prior to or at any point during construction as 
the actual building is not required.  
• There is no disruption to the venue or its occupants. 
• Large numbers of people do not need to be sourced (as with a trial evacuation 
at a stadium). 
• Alterations to egress routes can be made quickly and simulations rerun without 
the associated logistics of rerunning a trial evacuation. 
• A simulation produces a permanent, viewable record of the evacuation plan 
for the entire structure that can be easily reviewed in sections or as a whole. 
 
A number of software packages are available for this purpose. The one used in this 
study is Simulex32.  
4.4.2 Egress modelling 
Egress modelling has developed along two different lines. This is indicative of the 
background of the modellers126. One line of development has evolved from human 
behaviour research whereas the other has evolved from traffic modelling. 
 
With the first type of modelling a wide range of characteristic inputs are available and 
the modelling takes into account the way individuals within a crowd interact and 
allows for the impact of different behaviours and stimuli. The software involved is 
complex and consequently involves considerable computing power. The second type 
of modelling treats individuals within the crowd as independent individuals that do 
not interact with others. This is particularly evident when a conflict occurs and the 
individuals do not act cooperatively to overcome the conflict. For example one 
individual stopping to let another pass. Limited characteristics are available. These 
relate to speed, size and response time. With this type of modelling two different 
approaches to movement have been taken, one treats the flow of people as discrete 
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particles and can be described as “ball bearing” modelling127. Ball bearing modelling 
is also known as “cellular automata” modelling. The other treats the flow as a fluid or 
suspended solution. With this type of modelling individuals are swept along in the 
flow and eddies are created on the periphery. Simulex32 is one of the available 




The software used for the modelling part of this study was Simulex32 product version 
2.7.0.1 produced by IES Ltd. Simulex32 is a coordinate-based model designed for 
calculating evacuation movement of individuals in a multi-storey building. Simulex32 
was developed by Dr Peter Thompson of IES Ltd. 
4.4.3.1 Simulex32 
The Simulex32 model is quite simplistic with evacuation movement almost 
exclusively determined by the shortest route to an exit. It determines the rate of flow 
based on body size (of which four options are possible) and density of the crowd. 
Way finding and environmental conditions are not considered. Conflict Resolution 
within Simulex32 consists of two or more people banging into each other with some 
sideways shuffling in an attempt to get past each other. However if both individuals 
are trying to progress in the same general direction or if there is insufficient clear 
space for the individuals to shuffle past then an impasse is reached and neither person 
moves. This phenomenon results in opposing rather than merging flows. Models with 
greater behavioural properties apply rules and protocols to allow individuals to make 
decisions, resolving such conflicts. 
  
To develop a Simulex32 model a CAD drawing must first be developed and this is 
used to define the boundaries and distances to exits. The CAD drawing is inserted into 
Simulex32 as a DXF file. DXF files are standard ASCII text documents used to store 
vector data. This results in a two dimensional, floor plan representation of the 
structure in the Simulex32 model. The next step is to define exits, stairwells and links 
people will move through. These are inserted manually. Once this has been done 
distance maps are developed by the program in order to identify distances to exits 
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from all points within the represented structure. People may then be characterised and 
entered into the file, in preparation for simulations to commence. Characterisation 
options include basic size demographics, speed parameters which can be assigned to 
follow normal, triangular or uniform distributions, and predetermined exit selections 
can be assigned. 
 
The algorithms used in Simulex32 are based on real life data. Simulex32 allows for 
the following inputs. 
 
Up to 50 exits, 100 stairwells and up to 100 links may be included in a model. The 
size, orientation and location of these are all individually assigned. As mentioned 
previously it is possible to vary the characteristics of the population, altering the 
demographics and assigning exits to individuals or groups. However, as the number of 
distribution maps that can be used is limited to 10, it is difficult in a stadium structure 
to assign stairwells to individuals in the same way.  
 
The demographics of the population can be assigned using predetermined 
populations; such as commuters (30% average, 30% male, 30% female, 10% children) 
or by assigning a group as female, male, children or average. This determines the 
body size of the individuals.  
 
Figure 11: Simulex32 Body Types From (Thompson 1996) 
The four different body types have the following dimensions: 
Body type Average Male Female Child
R(t) (m) 0.25 0.27 0.24 0.21 
R(s) (m) 0.15 0.17 0.14 0.12 
S (m) 0.10 0.11 0.09 0.07 
Table 5: Simulex32 Body Type Dimensions From (Thompson 1996) 
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The population can also be assigned average response times with different 
distributions. Overtaking, queuing, and to some degree redirection are all built into the 
model. As individuals get closer their speed reduces with unimpeded walking speed 
being randomly distributed between 0.8m/s and 1.7m/s. 
 
Egress Paths 
Exits - As mentioned previously Simulex32 allows for up to 50 exits. Exit size, 
position and orientation are determined by the user. Through developing distance 
maps different groups or individuals can be assigned exits to use or by default they 
will select exits by the shortest path. 
 
Stairwells - Up to 100 exits may be included in a model. Stairwells allow the user to 
define width and length as well as orientation and position. Rise and run are preset 
and standard for all stairs. 
 
Links – Links are used to associate floors with stairs. The width of links is set by the 
user and may be independent of stair width to allow for doorways into the stairs. More 
than two links may be associated with one stair – allowing for multiple floors to enter 
a single stairwell. The model allows for up to 100 links. 
 
People - Modelling people in Simulex32 is to some degree customisable. Both the 
demographics and the response times of individuals or groups of individuals can be 
assigned within certain limitations. 
 
Demographics - The people simulated in the Simulex32 model are assumed to be 
able bodied and are all capable of a full range of speeds dependant on density. The 
speed of individuals with an unhindered (>1.5m) interpersonal distance is randomly 
determined using a normal distribution. Speeds and other properties of the Simulex32 
evacuation model are based on evacuation drill data and do not necessarily reflect the 
movement present in actual fires. It is assumed that during trials optimum speeds are 
reached as there are minimal obstructions and environmental stimuli to interfere with 
the evacuation. As such Simulex32 ‘should’ offer optimal evacuation times. Walking 
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velocities vary with density for densities with <1.5m interpersonal distance (Figure 
12). 
Response time - Response times may be preset by assigning a uniform, triangular or 
normal distribution curve to groups or individuals. Response times are then randomly 
assigned to those individuals in that population. It is interesting to note that a Weibull 
distribution has been identified by evacuation researchers as most closely matching 
evacuation drill data by several researchers129. Weibull distributions are determined 
by the shape parameter, this allows greater flexibility in fitting a curve to data. 
Weibull curves can therefore be used to fit data that is shifted from the mean as 
opposed to distributions, such as the normal curve, that are symmetrical about the 
mean. This allows for ‘tailing off’ that is commonly observed when the last people 
leave a structure. 
Assumptions 
In modelling the chosen stadia certain assumptions were made. These were made 
progressively in attempts to make the simulations run smoothly. While it is not 
Figure 12: Simulex32 Walking Velocities (Thompson 1996) 
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normal to ‘tweak’ a model when accurate input data is available, in this case 
unrealistic results were achieved when accurate floor plans and population 
distributions were input. Simplifications were made to reduce the occurrence of 
anomalies. Eliminating anomalous behaviour reduced simulation times making the 
results more credible. 
 
Only one stadium was modelled in its entirety. Initially the upper, corporate levels 
were modelled separately to the bowl. Vomitories between the bowl and concourse 
proved to inhibit egress far more than stairwells between the other levels and the 
concourse. Consequently, to reduce the processing time of the full model, the upper 
levels were simplified. Corporate levels were altered so that rooms became simple 
boxes with no obstacles for occupants to negotiate. Openings were changed to the 
same width as the stairwells. This was a valid simplification as early attempts to 
model egress showed that the passages immediately prior to the stairwells were the 
limiting factor in achieving evacuation from the upper levels rather than the width of 
doorways. The simplification did not impact on egress times for those levels. This 
simplification served two functions. It reduced processing time of the model without 
impacting on the flow rate from the upper floors and made the output images from the 
simulation more difficult to identify with a specific stadium, maintaining its 
anonymity. The following three figures illustrate how the passageway immediately 
prior to entering the stairwell impacts on movement. 
 
Figure 13: 5 seconds into the simulation a room near the stairway is emptying 
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Figure 14: 19s into the simulation all rooms have emptied and all occupants are in the outer passageway 
enroute to stair ways. 
 
Figure 15: 35s into the simulation congestion in passageways immediately prior to stairwells determines the 
rate of egress 
4.4.3.2 AutoCAD 
All CAD drawings used in modelling for this study were developed or modified using 
AutoCAD 2000. Files inserted into Simulex32 were in DXF2000 format. All non-
essential information was stripped from the DXF files prior to inserting the floor plans 
into Simulex. Files were modified where necessary in order to improve the 
performance of the Simulex32 modelling. 
4.4.4 Data Processing 
Video footage, hand calculations and egress simulations were compared in order to 
determine how well they correlate. This was performed using standard spreadsheets to 
produce data summaries. Figure 13 shows the information obtained. Not all egress 
paths produced sufficient information to fill all fields on the sheets. This was due to 
the suitability of the pathway, and viewing limitations. 
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Observational Data Unit     Unit 
Capacity of Stadium (g) people Width of path (W)  metres 
Attendance at event (q) people Boundary layer (b)  metres 
Time to clear stadium (tc) minutes Effective Width (We) W-2b metres 
Flow Rates       
Time to clear gate/path/stair (h) minutes Specific flow speed x We people/s/m effective width 
Total usage of gate/path/stair (y) people     
Time to reach max Fs (t) minutes Maximum Specific Flow (Fs -max)  people/s/m effective width 
Total usage at max Fs (x) people Population in area We x L  people  
Density at max Fs people/m2     
Time to reach sustained Fs minutes Sustained Specific Flow (Fs)  people/s/m effective width 
Duration of sustained Fs minutes     
Density at sustained Fs people/m2     
Queuing time seconds Calculated Flow (Fc) Fs x We people/minute 
Queue density people/m2     
Boundary layer maintained       
Individual Speeds    time/L   
Travel distance (L) metres Mean speed  m/s 
Terrain   Maximum speed  m/s 
Total no. individuals tracked   Minimum speed   m/s 
Estimated Evacuation Times (if monitored gate flow is representative of all gates)      
Fraction to leave through gate pre max Fs (A)  x/y   - 
Fraction of populous to use gate (B)  y/q   - 
Total to leave through gate post max Fs (C )  y-x  people 
Estimated populous to leave pre max Fs (f)  x/B  people 
Estimated populous to leave post max Fs (r )  q-f  people 
Est. min. egress time for gate (Tg)  (C/ Fc) + t  minutes 
Est. min. egress time for populous (Tp)  ((C/ Fc)/(h/tc)) + t  minutes 
Est. min. egress time for full stadium (Tf)   ((g/q) x (C/ Fc)/(h/tc)) + t   minutes 
Evacuation Estimates (based on established research)         
Anticipated Fs (Fruin) a=1.9 (people/m2) k=1.40(flat), 1.16 (stair) (m/s) k people/s/m effective width 
Anticipated Fc (Fruin)  Fs (Fruin)xWex60  people/minute 
Anticipated Fs (Poyner) a=1.9 (people/m2)* k=1.8 (flat) (m/s) k people/s/m effective width 
Anticipated Fc (Poyner)  Fs (Poyner)xWex60  people/minute 
Anticipated density at max Fs assuming max unimpeded speed (Fruin)  Fs /k  people/m2 
Anticipated density at max Fs based on observed mean speed (Fruin)  Fs -max/S  people/m2 
*actual value unavailable, estimated as being the same as for Fruin       
Figure 16: Master data sheet
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5 Results 
Eleven venues were visited and studied. They have randomly been assigned 
pseudonyms A-K. Where particular stadia are identified, the associated information is 
readily available in the public domain and was not necessarily obtained during field 
observations. Video footage of people movement was obtained for 23 egress paths 
within these stadia. Multiple events were attended at three of the stadia. Not all video 
footage was of suitable quality to obtain consistently reliable results. This was due to a 
number of factors including; obscuration of view, inappropriate angle to the flow, and 
complexity of movement.  
 
In summary, video data obtained can be broken down as follows: 
 
• Individuals speeds of egressing patrons were obtained from 8 locations 
• Crowd densities were obtained from 7 locations 
• Specific flow data was obtained from 8 locations 
• Total egress times of general admission patrons were obtained for 13 events 
 
Results have been divided into two sections. The first contains fire protection 
information gained from observations and interviews. This is displayed as tables on the 
following pages. The first table (table 6) provides general information about the stadia 
and anticipated response capabilities. The tables following that (tables 7 and 8) identify 
the components of the fire protection systems that were present. There is a common key 
to tables 7 and 8.  
 
Table 7 is concerned only with aspects of fire protection that are connected directly to 
the fire service. It details whether active fire protection is present in various locations 
within stadia. The active protection referred to includes manual call points, sprinklers, 
heat detectors and smoke detectors.  
 
Table 8 identifies the range of fire protection used in protecting the stadia. Not all areas 
of stadia were protected by all types of fire protection. For example fire resistant glazing 
was only present in areas such as lounges and suites with large vision panels. In this 
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case they provide protection against fire spread such as that of the Texas Stadium fire 
described in the literature review. 
 
The second section of the results contains data obtained for specific egress paths from 
video analysis, calculations and computer simulations. Specific flow data has been 
calculated for one minute periods at five second intervals. A brief description of 
locations that were videoed, including those that were not suitable for video analysis is 
provided. A rough sketch is included to aid visualisation of the egress scenario that was 
observed.  
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Results from Interviews and Survey sheets 
Stadium A B C D E F G H I J K 
Stadium Egress time post game (min) 21 16 18 9 24 19 38 15 est. 8 est. <10 est. 12 est. 
Crowd Coordinators Contractors Contractors In House In House In House Contractors Contractors Contractors In House In House In House 
Fire Service Presence (before/after/during event) 
Mostly Sometimes Always Never Never Never Always Always Never Never Never 
Fire service accommodated for in  
main control room 
Yes Yes Yes No No No Yes Yes No No No 
Number of Separate Fire Control Rooms 1 1 1 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Distance to nearest Fire Service 0-3km 0-3km 0-3km 0-3km 0-3km 0-3km 0-3km 3-5km 5-0km 0-3km 5-10km 
Expected Response Time <5min <5min <5min <5min <5min <5min <5min <10min <10 min <5min <10min 
Foreseen Delays Traffic Nil Nil Traffic Nil Traffic Traffic Traffic Nil Nil Nil 
Anticipated Evacuation Time 8 min <8 min 8 min <8 min 8 min 10 min >15 min <8 min 8 min ? ? 
Foreseen Delays 







nil nil nil 
preferred 
route 
Alternate fire engine access/fire control 
 room 
No Yes No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes 
Full radio coverage for staff Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Trained fire wardens Yes Yes No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Event type fire drills carried out regularly No No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Non-event type fire drills carried out regularly Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Fire Service Approved Evacuation Schemes No No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Table 6: Stadium Survey Sheet 1 – Background Information
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Active Fire Protection connected to Fire Service 
Stadium A B C D E F G H I J K 
Concessions - fixed Y Y Y Y Y N/A N Y Y Y Y 
Concessions - mobile Y Y Y N/A N/A N N Y N/A N/A N/A 
Kitchens Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Offices Y Y Y Y Y N Y Y Y Y Y 
Storage areas Y Y Y N N N N Y Y Y Y 
Players areas Y Y Y Y Y N N Y Y Y Y 
Restaurants Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Lounges Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Suites  Y Y Y Y N Y N Y Y Y Y 
Temporary stands N/A N N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Outdoor permanent stands N N N N N N N N N/A N/A N 
Covered permanent stands N N N Y N N N Y N/A Y Y 
Control Rooms Y Y Y Y Y Y N Y Y Y Y 
Car parking Y Y N N N N N Y N/A N/A Y 
Concourse N Y N Y N N Y Y Y Y Y 
Ticket Booths/Turnstiles N N N N N N N N Y Y Y 
Surrounding grounds N N N N N N N N Y N Y 
Toilet Facilities Y Y Y Y N N Y N Y Y Y 
Embankment/Terraces N/A N/A N N N/A N N N N/A N/A N/A 
Scoreboard/Big Screen Y Y Y Y ? Y Y N Y Y Y 
First Aid/Police Rooms Y Y Y Y ? Y N/A N Y Y Y 
Gathering Places/Landmarks N/A N N N N N N/A N/A Y N N/A 
Table 7: Stadium Survey Sheet 2 – Active Fire Protection 
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Interview and Observational Information from Stadia that were Visited Fire Protection Used at 
Stadium A B C D E F G H I J K 
Structural fire protection Y Y Y Y Y Y * Y Y Y Y 
Fire resistant glazing ? ? ? ? ? ? ? N Y Y Y 
Fire doors Y Y Y Y Y * * Y Y Y Y 
Fire Cells Y Y Y Y Y * * Y Y Y Y 
Addressable detection 
system Y Y Y Y Y Y N Y Y Y Y 
Smoke detectors Y Y Y Y Y N N Y Y Y Y 
Smoke extraction system * Y Y N Y N N Y Y Y Y 
Smoke curtains Y Y N N ? ? N N ? ? ? 
Sprinklers Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Direct link to fire service Y Y Y Y Y Y N Y Y Y Y 
Risers Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Hose reels Y Y Y N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Extinguishers Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Manual call points Y Y Y Y Y Y * Y Y Y Y 
Sounders Y Y Y Y Y Y * Y Y Y Y 
Backup lighting/power N N Y Y Y Y N Y Y Y Y 
Fire exits Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Reflective Exit signs Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Lit Exit signs Y Y N Y Y N N Y Y Y Y 
Evacuation signage Y Y Y Y Y N N Y Y Y Y 
Reflective/Marked egress 
paths Y Y N N N N N N Y Y Y 
Muster points ? ? ? Y Y N ? Y ? ? Y 
Public addressable 
televisions Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Public addressable sound 
system Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
CCTV Y Y Y Y Y Y N Y Y Y Y 
                        
Key                       
Y Present in some or all sections of the stadium at time of visit  
N Not present in any section of the stadium at time of visit  
N/A Not applicable to this stadium 
* incomplete/some disabled at time of visit 
? unknown/not certain at time of visit 
Table 8: Stadium Survey Sheet 3 - Methods of Fire Protection used at Stadia 
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5.1 Fire Protection Information 
From table 6 it is evident that there is wide variation between the stadia and their approach to 
fire preparedness. Five of the stadia have some level of fire service presence in event 
operations. This ranged from maintaining a presence in the operations control room through 
to quizzing fire wardens, inspecting the occupancies and filing reports on their findings. Most 
stadia were located very close to a fire station and their expectations for how long it would 
take for the fire service to respond was reflected by this. Despite the proximity; it was 
recognised by fire station personnel, fire safety officers and or stadium management that at 
five of the stadia there was the potential for delayed response due to traffic problems. 
 
Several stadia had multiple access points for the fire service to approach the fire control room 
from and two had multiple fire control rooms. The reasons given for these were to mitigate 
against access problems due to patrons or traffic, to allow better access to different parts of 
the stadium, because the fire control room had been relocated and to better facilitate response 
in the event of a large fire. 
 
For most of the stadia there was a marked difference between the anticipated evacuation time 
and the time taken for regular post game egress (based on past observations of interviewees). 
This was most obvious in stadia C, E, F and G. Stadium G took the longest to clear post game 
and recognised that this was a problem as far as patron enjoyment was concerned. They 
anticipated that an evacuation could take longer than might be expected but did not see this 
delay as life threatening, nor had any work been done to reduce the time taken to clear the 
grounds. Stadia C, E and F credited the difference as being due to stragglers and autograph 
hunters. However, of these three stadia only E had conducted event type fire drills to verify 
their anticipated evacuation time. The basis for determining anticipated evacuation times 
quoted by interviewees varied. Some were quoted from evacuation plans, others were not. 
Several stadia indicated that they had attempted to comply with the eight minute acceptable 
evacuation time recommended in the Green Guide. 
 
From table 7 it is evident that several stadia rely heavily on people alerting the fire service 
rather than on the activation of fire protection systems to alert the fire service of a fire. This is 
due in part to a history of false alarms and in part to the age of the structures. All of the 
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modern structures used EWIS to monitor fire protection systems but few of the older 
structures had this installed. For those stadia that do not rely on fire protection systems to alert 
the fire service there is the potential for a fire to develop unnoticed in many areas if it 
occurred in non event times or during a small scale event. The stadium most vulnerable to this 
is stadium G.  
 
In contrast to stadium G, stadium I has adopted the opposite approach where virtually the 
entire grounds are protected by an active system connected to the fire service. Stadium I has 
identified gathering places that people tend to congregate around external to the buildings and 
has installed active fire protection in these areas too. Stadiums I and K had the most extensive 
fire service connected active fire protection of those stadia visited. 
 
From table 8 it is evident that stadia utilise a wide range of fire protection devices. All stadia 
have incorporated their public address systems into their fire protection and evacuation plans 
with most using closed circuit television monitoring (cctv) to identify and observe suspicious 
activities. Not all devices were used in all areas. Most notable was the absence of manual call 
points in areas that were not readily visible to security. Stadium G was the only stadium 
without smoke detectors. This was due to the smoking policy of the stadium. Stadium G was 
the only stadium that had not become smoke-free at the time of this study. All other stadia had 
adopted or were in the process of adopting smoke-free policies. 
 
Overall most areas of most stadia were equipped with comprehensive fire protection. The 
notable exception being stadium G. Stadium G is in the process of upgrading some of its 
facilities and it is anticipated that the level of fire protection will improve as part of that 
process. 
 
One area where half of the stadia could improve is in the holding of event type fire drills. 
There are two strategies used by stadia to implement evacuations; total evacuation or 
staged/partial evacuation. For an occupancy of potentially 20,000 or more both strategies 
require a degree of coordination and practice. The main deterrents to holding fire drills were 
given as the cost of bringing in sufficient staff and pretend patrons to hold a drill, the 
disruption to an event and television coverage if a drill was held during an event, disruption to 
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patrons and the potential for confusing incoming patrons if a drill was held prior to an event. 
Two stadia overcame these objections by using school aged students on non event days and 
providing a tour or catering as way of payment. They felt the cost of bringing in event staff 
for the drill was not excessive.  
 
Information on the adoption of international documents and guidelines in combining crowd 
management, fire protection and evacuation planning has not been laid out in a table. This is 
because there was great variation in how guidelines had been incorporated into stadium 
management. No stadium had adopted a single set of guidelines in its entirety and several had 
only applied guidelines to certain areas of the stadium or certain aspects of coordinating 
egress movement. 
 
Stadia adapted a range of documents and guidelines in order to meet their crowd management 
needs. This was dependant on the awareness of management and consultants to the existence 
of such documents. No guidance is provided in New Zealand with regards to suitable sources 
of such information. Consequently the application of these guidelines varied.  
 
Because crowd management and evacuation planning are closely linked there is an 
implication that evacuation planning can be impacted by crowd management strategies. This 
is recognised internationally and has led to the creation of such documents as the Green 
Guide. Advanced crowd management strategies are not considered as part of meeting the 
provisions of the New Zealand Building Code but are alluded to in meeting obligations under 
the Fire Safety and Evacuation of Building Regulations. From table 5 it is apparent that not all 
stadium have met this obligation. 
 
In reviewing the application of adopted documents, primarily NFPA 102 and the Green 
Guide, deviations from the guidelines were apparent. At one stadium crush barriers had been 
installed as part of following the Green Guide’s recommendation on managing festival seating 
areas. However, they did not comply with the installation layout as set out in the Green Guide 
and followed a layout that is recognised in the current Green Guide as being inappropriate. 
This deviation from the Green Guide recommendations had not been picked up. The layout 
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has recognised implications on safety of high density crowd movement and therefore potential 
impacts on egress and evacuation.  
 
At various stadia there were instances where a document was quoted as the reason for the 
adoption of crowd management or evacuation planning strategies, but upon investigation 
these were found to be inconsistent with the quoted document. It is thought that in some cases 
these deviations or partial adoption may be detrimental to actual evacuations in the affected 
parts of the stadia.  
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5.2 Specific Egress Paths 
5.2.1 Egress Path 1 
Egress path 1 was part of a pathway near one of the main entrance-exits to the 
stadium. The pathway had a row of bollards across it. Not all bollards were in place at 




Figure 17: Sketch of egress path 1 
 
Egress path 1 took a relatively long time for the flow of people to abate completely. 
This might indicate it to be a preferential exit from the grounds for all areas of the 
stadium. This would be a reasonable assumption to make based on the proximity of 
public transport and car parking and that the specific flow profile is similar to that 
produced in modelling the evacuation of final exits for a complete stadium. The 
specific flow remained lower than predicted by Fruin and the egress continued for 
over 25 minutes indicating a long travel path.  
 
At no point was crowd density sufficient to use the entire exit way. The maximum 
number of people who crossed the egress point simultaneously was five. People 
generally crossed the effective width in groups of two or three. Although most people 
maintained a boundary layer around the bollards some people hurdled them or 
stopped beside them to wait for others. This data reflects free motion with relatively 
wide variations in specific flow. The specific flows observed are relatively low. This 




- 73 - 
 
In comparing figure 18 and 19 it should be noted that, as described earlier on page 65, 
figure 19 is not derived directly from figure 18. Figure 18 reflects data collection that 
has been binned into 5 second intervals. Figure 19 shows the specific flows, 
calculated for one minute periods at 5 second intervals. This makes periods of 
consistent flow more obvious and enables mean flow values to be established more 
easily.   
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Figure 18: Egress Path 001 – egress as a function of time 
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Figure 19: Egress Path 001 – specific flow as a function of time 
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5.2.2 Egress Path 2 
Egress path 2 went across a concourse area between a vomitory and a staircase. The double 
headed arrow indicates the monitored path. People exiting the vomitory moved away in three 
directions. Most moved along the concourse to their left. The remaining occupants were divided 
between following the concourse to their right and exiting via the staircase. Only those using the 




Figure 20: Sketch of egress path 2 
 
Egress path 2 was monitored in order to assess walking speeds of egressing patrons but also 
served to support the theory that people do not always egress via the shortest route. A very low 
number of patrons exited the vomitory and crossed the concourse to the exit. Speeds varied 
considerably. Some people were almost running while others moved very slowly. Density 
remained low throughout the egress period so this data reflects free motion (figure 21). 
 
Distance travelled was estimated. The measured distance was taken from the centre of the 
vomitory to the centre of the base of the staircase. This was the shortest path to exit the stadium 
from that vomitory but relatively few people used it. Reconnaissance of the grounds revealed 
that this was the exit closest to the taxi stands but one of the furthest from other public transport 
and the car parks. It is suspected that this may have influenced exit choice. 
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Figure 21: Egress Path 002 – egress speeds
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5.2.3 Egress Path 3 
This egress path involved movement down a divided staircase. In this instance the staircase was 
divided evenly in two by a central handrail. On side A of the stair a person with a walking stick 
had difficulty descending the stairs. Other patrons offered assistance. This created a congestion 
point or bottle-neck on one side of the staircase, reducing the effective width to C. C was 
variable and not measured. Travel times were recorded for individuals to descend only when 
people approached both sides of the stair within 1 second of one another. 
 
 
Figure 22: Sketch of egress path 3 
 
Egress path 3 was unusual in that it presented the opportunity to observe a temporal disparity in 
movement on structurally identical stairs. A temporary congestion point was generated through 
slow movement of a member of the crowd. Speeds were compared for people initiating descent 
of the stairs at approximately the same time. Variance in speeds indicates that patrons using stair 
A were slower than for stair B. The graph on the following page (figure 23) shows that once the 
congestion point was established speeds reduced from >1m/s down to <0.4m/s. The mobility 
impaired patron took approximately ten times as long to descend the stairs as able bodied patrons 
on uncongested stairs (see figure 24). These results indicate the potential for temporarily 
congested flow to have a major impact on egress movement. This could have significant 
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Uncongested stair Congested Stair
 
 
Figure 23: Egress Path 003 – egress speeds 
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Egress path 003 - comparison of times taken to traverse 6.5m down a divided staircase when one 


































Figure 24: Egress Path 003 – egress duration
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5.2.4 Egress Path 4 
Egress path 4 produced a main body of activity within the first 2.5 minutes. Usage of this path 
was over relatively quickly compared to the total egress time for the stadium. An unusually large 
number of people used this egress path while other potential egress paths nearby remained 
relatively unused. This path was one of the main ingress paths before the game and that may 
have influenced egress path selection. Speeds (figure 28) were calculated from the time to travel 
between the dotted lines. This represents a distance of 3.5m. Densities were calculated at the 




Figure 25: Sketch of egress path 4 
 
This was one of the main ingress areas of the stadium and its egress usage may be a reflection of 
that. The contrast between maximum and sustained specific flow values (figure 27) may indicate 
that there was greater independent movement within this crowd than for others of lower effective 
width. The effective width in conjunction with familiarity with the path, due to this being a main 
ingress path, may have influenced speed. It appeared more as if people were swept along by the 
high density rather than experiencing restricted movement. This was a flat simple layout with no 
corners. Knowledge to that effect may have made people more assured about moving quickly at 
that order of density. 
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Egress path 004 - counts of people egressing through a  8.6m effective width section of concourse 


























Figure 26: Egress Path 004 – egress as a function of time 
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Specific flow rate, Fs, for Egress path 004 - people egressing through a 8.6m effective width section 































Mean flow = 1.03
Std Deviation = 0.05
Mean flow = 0.34
Std Deviation = 0.02
 
Figure 27: Egress Path 004 – specific flow as a function of time
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Mean speed: 1.5 m/s
Minimum speed: 1  m/s
Maximum speed: 1.75 m/s
Std Deviation: 0.26
 
 Figure 28: Egress Path 004 – egress speeds
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5.2.5 Egress Path 5 
This egress path was a ramp. It was intended to track people from the start of the ramp to where 
it met a level surface. Unfortunately due to the angle and lighting egress movement on this ramp 
was difficult to discern from the video footage. Consequently results were not recorded. It was 
noted that few people used the handrails, unlike observations of people on stairs. This may be 
one attribute to ramps that makes movement on them more akin to walkways than stairs. 
 
 
Figure 29: Sketch of egress path 5 
 
5.2.6 Egress Path 6 
This egress path was a vomitory amongst bleachers. The intent was to monitor the flows D, C 
and B into A. Once egress started a queue developed and people spread across the bleachers 









Figure 30: Sketch of egress path 6 
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5.2.7 Egress Path 7 
Egress path 7 was a staircase. Egress was monitored from the landing to the ground. The length 
of the handrail was taken as the distance travelled. Egress appeared to occur in waves as if the 




Figure 31: Sketch of egress path 7 
 
The waves of activity that were observed are reflected in the way the specific flow fluctuated 
(figure 33). This may indicate that people in the area feeding the staircase waited for densities to 
decrease before entering the staircase. Both the anticipated specific flow and the density were 
greater than the figures suggested by Fruin130 for this effective width. The density is very similar 
to that observed on walkways in other egress paths. This may be influenced by egress movement 
approaching the stairs and or by the size of the staircase. Presumably the greater the length of the 
staircase the greater its influence on densities of occupants. 
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Figure 32: Egress Path 007 – egress as a function of time 
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Specific flow rate, Fs, for egress path 007 - people egressing down a 1.2m effective width staircase 




































Figure 33: Egress Path 007 – specific flow as a function of time 
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Minimum speed: 0.2 m/s
Maximum speed: 0.5 m/s
Std Deviation: 0.08
  
Figure 34: Egress Path 007 – egress speeds
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5.2.8 Egress Path 8 
Egress path 8 was bordered by a fence and a garden. Egress along this path appeared constant 
until the end. The flow stopped relatively quickly. The nearby egress paths were much wider 
than egress path 8 and better lit. It is hypothesised patrons selected these alternate routes in 
preference to egress path 8 once they had cleared. Because this was one of several routes leading 
to the final exit movement was most likely slow due to one of these other routes having 







Figure 35: Sketch of egress path 8 
 
Egress counts for egress path 8 (figure 36) appear to indicate pulses of movement within the 
crowd. This was not obvious on initial observation and is not reflected in the specific flow data 
(figure 37). Speeds of individuals within the crowd remained fairly constant throughout (figure 
38). The sustained specific flow remains relatively low for the majority of the path use but the 
associated densities were considerably higher than those predicted for optimum specific flow by 
either Poyner et al or Fruin so this is not unexpected. 
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Egress path 008 - counts of people egressing through a 2.1m effective width section of concourse 




























Figure 36: Egress Path 008 – egress as a function of time 
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Specific flow rate, Fs, for egress path 008 - people egressing through a 2.1m effective width section 



































Mean flow: 0.8 
people/m/s
Std deviation:  0.04
 
Figure 37: Egress Path 008 – specific flow as a function of time
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Mean speed: 0.35 m/s




Figure 38: Egress Path 008 – egress speeds
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5.2.9 Egress Path 9 
Egress path 9 involved the intersection of a staircase and a walkway. The intent was to monitor 
egress across the base of the staircase. Unfortunately flow along the walkway to the side of the 




Figure 39: Sketch of egress path 9 
 
5.2.10 Egress Path 10 
Egress path 10 was located in a different area of the same stadium as egress path 9. This egress 
path was not monitored until six minutes after the game finished. Because of this a full profile of 
the path was not recorded. This was an interesting path because it narrowed due to a vehicle that 
had been parked along side it and a bend in the path. Counts were taken across the narrowest 
point and densities were calculated for the entire narrow section (marked by dotted lines). 
 
 
Figure 40: Sketch of egress path 10 
 
Consistent flow was maintained for a large proportion of the time egress path 10 was monitored. 
This may indicate that due to the narrowing of the path specific flow was modified by increasing 
density. The densities measured for this pathway were not discernible at the narrowest point as 
distinct from the whole area of monitored travel. Both specific flow and mean speeds increased 
markedly towards the end of this paths usage indicating that the density for the majority of the 
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monitored period was high enough to impact on movement along this pathway. The recorded 
speeds were relatively slow indicating that movement was inhibited. The effect of the narrowing 
path may have been exaggerated by the vehicle’s shape. Protrusions such as rear view mirrors 
may have exaggerated the observance of a boundary layer. This is speculation as a view of 
proximity to the vehicle was not obvious from the video footage. Regardless of the reasons a 
high density low speed crowd movement was observed. 
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Egress path 010 - counts of people egressing through a 2.6m effective width congestion point along 






























Figure 41: Egress Path 010 – egress as a function of time 
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Specific flow rate, Fs, for egress path 010 -  people egressing through a  2.6m effective width 





































Mean flow: 1.53 people/m/s
Std deviation: 0.03
 
Figure 42: Egress Path 010 – specific flow as a function of time 
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Egress path 010 - speeds of people egressing through a  2.6m wide congestion point along a section 

















Mean speed: 0.54 m/s
Minimum speed:  0.35 m/s
Maximum speed: 0.74 m/s
Std deviation:  0.11
 
Figure 43: Egress path 010 – egress speeds
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5.2.11 Egress Path 11 
Egress path 11 was not strictly observation of an egress path. Rather, it was observation of 
egress preferences and influences from inside the arena. From the interior of the stadium the time 
to clear different sections of the bowl were recorded in order to determine if any part of the 
stadium experienced any notable congestion. This was done in order to try and glean greater 
understanding of observations from concourses. It also served to offer some insight as to the 
believability of simulated egress from the stadium. The stadium attendance was well below 
capacity and not all sections were occupied.  
 
Stadium management provided floor plans of the stadium and these were used to map out the 
occupied areas. The stadium was divided into nine zones (I-IX). Up to four levels of seating were 
available in the various stands around the stadium so zones were subdivided into levels. Of the 
resulting sections only sixteen were in use during the game. The times for each section to empty 




Level 4 Level 3 Level 2 Level 1 
I    10.25pm 
II 10.25pm   10.28pm 
III 10.25pm 10.24pm  10.30pm 
IV    10.29pm 
V 10.24pm 10.23pm 10.24 10.26pm 
VI 10.26pm    
VII    10.27pm 
VIII 10.24pm   10.24pm 
IX    10.27pm 
10.27 all clear except italicised bold. All clear in 8 minutes 
Table 9: Egress Path 11 Zone Clearance 
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No queuing was observed at any of the vomitories. There was a six minute difference between 
the first and last section clearing. The majority of the occupants had left the bowl in less than 5 
minutes. The oldest occupied stand (Zones II-IV on Level 1) was the slowest to clear. The 
vomitories for this stand are located further back from the arena than in any of the other stands. 
The increased path distance will have contributed to the longer egress time. In most cases people 
left through the nearest vomitory to their seat. A minority of people walked to other vomitories. 
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5.2.12 Egress Path 12 
Stadium management suggested that the intersection of a stairwell and vomitory at this egress 
point would be suitable for recording merging flows. Unfortunately neither the stairwell nor the 
vomitory experienced sufficient flow to obtain any useful data. The reason that this egress path 




Figure 44: Sketch of egress path 12 
 
5.2.13 Egress Path 13 and 14 
Egress path 13 monitored the same area as an egress path 14 but was filmed during half time 
rather than post game. Flow in this video footage went in two directions and was near retail 
concessions. Speeds were recorded for a section of the concourse (indicated by dashed lines in 
figure 45). Movement along the concourse occurred in two directions and a recessed area with 
concessions provided two way flow to and from the concourse. The flow was complex in this 
area hence it was monitored at both half time and full time. The direction of flow was more 
varied during half time (Egress path 13). This was probably due the large area of seating that was 




Figure 45: Sketch of egress path 13 & 14 
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Egress path 13 
The most interesting feature of this profile is that Egress path 13 produced higher flow rate 
values than egress path 14. This may be due to people accessing the concessions and returning as 
opposed to the end of the game when return movement is uncharacteristic. 
  
There was a discernable decrease in movement towards the middle of half time which was 
discernible in both speed and specific flow data. This may be attributable to queuing at the 
concessions.  
 
Egress path 14 
Egress path 14 experienced a wide range of speeds with the fastest movement occurring towards 
the end of the egress. Notably greater speeds were achieved post game (egress path 14) than at 
half time (egress path 13) despite egress path 13 having higher flows.  
 
The maximum specific flow in both egress path 13 and 14 was lower than for most of the other 
egress paths observed. In both egress paths 13 and 14 a large proportion of the crowd appeared 
to be milling rather than egressing. This, and the multidirectional flow, may have contributed to 
these results being lower than those observed in other egress paths. 
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Egress path 013 - counts of people moving along egress path in two directions near concessions 






















Figure 46: Egress Path 013 – egress as a function of time 
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Specific flow rate, Fs, for egress path 013 -  people moving along egress path in two directions near 








































Figure 47: Egress Path 013 – specific flow as a function of time 
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Egress path 013 - speeds of peoplemoving along egress path in two directions near concessions 





















Mean speed: 0.7 m/s
Minimum speed: 0.4 m/s
Maximum speed: 1.1 m/s
Std deviation: 0.19
 
Figure 48: Egress path 013 – egress speeds
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Figure 49: Egress Path 014 – egress as a function of time 
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Specific flow rate, Fs, for egress path 014 - people moving along a 4.5m wide egress path in two 






































Figure 50: Egress Path 014 – specific flow as a function of time 
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Mean speed: 0.9 m/s
Minimum speed: 0.6 m/s
Maximum speed: 1.5 m/s
Std deviation: 0.25
 
Figure 51: Egress Path 014 – egress speeds
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5.2.14 Egress Path 15 
Egress path 15 was an intersection between terraces and concourse. Egress through the 
intersection was monitored. A large proportion of the crowd on the terraces walked past this 
egress point and queued to exit onto the concourse at a point closer to the final exit. Flow 




Figure 52: Sketch of egress path 15 
 
The maximum flow rate at egress path 15 was rapidly reached (figure 54) and a high flow was 
maintained from that point for approximately 3 minutes. This egress path exhibited the highest 
sustained specific flow of any of the observed walkways. It also closely matched calculated flow 
using the Green Guide. The flow of people with time dropped off markedly after 3.5 minutes. 
The reason for this may be that preferential pathways had cleared and these alternate routes were 
used.  
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Figure 53: Egress Path 015 – egress as a function of time 
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Specific flow, Fs, for eEgress path 015 - counts of people moving onto a concourse through a 1.3m 







































Figure 54: Egress Path 015 – specific flow as a function of time 
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5.2.15 Egress Path 16 
Egress path 16 involved the intersection of a vomitory with a concourse at half time during a 
game. Relatively little movement occurred through this vomitory. There was insufficient 




Figure 55: Sketch of egress path 16 
 
5.2.16 Egress Path 17 
Egress path 17 was post game observation of a walkway between a stand and the arena. This was 
one of the few incidents of queuing that were observed. The cause of the queuing was a temporal 
congestion point generated by a football player at the edge of the arena engaging fans. Due to the 
angle of observation and density of people it was not possible to discern milling fans from 
egressing patrons. Because of this density of the moving crowd and flow rates could not be 
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5.2.17 Egress Path 18 
Egress path 18 concerned patrons egressing through a vomitory. Data was recorded of the 
number of people who exited. This egress path was specifically simulated using Simulex32. It 
was represented as a link (indicated by the double headed arrow in figure 57) between the inside 
of the bowl and the concourse. A comparison of simulation data and actual data is described in 
section 5.2 Simulation. 
 
 
Figure 57: Sketch of egress path 18 
 
Actual egress through this vomitory was relatively low. Sustained flow was not observed and it 
cleared within six minutes. The observed egress exhibited quite a high specific flow with the 
maximum specific flow being reached relatively quickly. This may have been due to the 
vomitory’s distance from the main exit. Although the specific flow is high, other observed 
specific flows were similar and the value is not outside the expected range.  
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5.2.18 Egress Path 19 
Egress path 19 was similar in layout to egress paths 4 and 8. Patrons experienced free movement 
but the two points selected for measuring the travel distance were difficult to discern on the 
video footage. Consequently this data has not been analysed. 
 
 
Figure 58: Sketch of egress path 19 
 
5.2.19 Egress Path 20, Egress Path 21 
This egress point was observed during half time (egress path 20) and at full time (egress path 
21). At this intersection flow from one direction interfered with flow from another direction. 




Figure 59: Sketch of egress path 20 & 21 
Analysis of this path was not possible due to its complexity. Movement at the intersection 
consisted of crossed flow, merging flow and queuing. Similar congestion patterns were 
observed at half and full time although the congestion was far more pronounced at full 
time. 
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5.2.20 Egress Path 22 
Video footage of this egress point was accidentally erased before it could be analysed. This 
egress path had a similar layout to egress path 9. 
 
 
Figure 60: Sketch of egress path 22 
 
5.2.21 Egress Path 23 
Egress path 23 was observed outside a stadium, along a street. Following a football game crowd 
movement along the footpath between a street sign and a lamp post was observed (figure 61). 
This was done to determine if there was any behavioural difference between people inside the 
stadium and those outside the stadium. It was found that there were differences. The most 
obvious difference was that people inside the stadium appeared to focus on their path whereas 
people outside the stadium often looked around assessing the surroundings. Another difference 
was that people did not adhere to the pathway. Rather than remain on the footpath many walked 
on the road or across the road into slow moving traffic. Movement in the stadium was far more 




Figure 61: Sketch of egress path 23
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5.2 Simulation 
Three stadia were initially selected for modelling and calculations comparison with observational 
data. It was envisaged that one stadium would be simulated in its entirety, one stadium’s 
embankment/terrace area and associated shared pathways would be modelled and one stadium’s 
slowest evacuation point – cross flow near a vomitory (egress path 20), would be simulated.  
 
Problems Encountered 
• Evacuation simulations of the embankment and of egress path 20 proved beyond the 
capabilities of the simulation software. 
• Evacuation of the embankment would not run due to the high population density – people 
from different directions converged and jammed up within the first few seconds. Modelling of 
egress path 20 succumbed to similar problems.  
• Complete evacuation of the third stadium proved more successful, but only after the floor 
plans were modified. An outline of the modelling results of this stadium are summarised on the 
following pages. 
 
Simulation of a Vomitory (egress path 18) 
In comparing egress measurements from observation and simulation (figure 62) there is a 
significant difference between the anticipated specific flow and the observed specific flow. The 
simulation only achieved 25% of the cumulative egress observed for this vomitory. The 
maximum specific flow was significantly lower in the simulation than that which was observed.  
 
Calculated egress flow values based on the effective width (1.4m) produce values that are more 










(people/second/metre effective width) 
1.88 1.40 1.80 0.82 
Fc (people/minute) 158 118 151 69 
Table 10: Estimated flows for egress path 18 
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The observed egress was closest to calculations based on values from Poyner et al’s study, which 
are advocated in the Green Guide. This stadium’s egress paths were developed using Green 
Guide values. Observed egress times from the stadium as a whole closely matched the 
recommended values given in the Green Guide. 
 
In reviewing the simulated data it was determined that other vomitories closer to the final exits 
of the stadium were chosen in preference to this one. Hence individuals within the model moved 
around the interior of the bowl, past this vomitory, and congregated around vomitories that were 
closest to final exits rather than using the most proximate vomitory to their starting position.  
 
In comparing simulation data for an entire stadium with that observed for the same stadium, the 
simulation was found to be grossly conservative in anticipating exit usage rates. The main reason 
for this was the disproportionate use of vomitories. As outlined in previous examples, patrons at 
stadia exhibit a tendency to select the shortest route to their desired exit but this is not carte 
blanche. Ease of access to the shortest route reduces the proportion of people that behave in this 
manner. The simulation does not take this into account and so more people select the shortest 
route than is observed. In the simulations performed this meant that some vomitories were not 
used in preference to others. This led to overloading of the preferred vomitories to the exclusion 
of others nearby. A disproportionate number of occupants in the simulation moved around the 
seating area and selected the vomitories that were closer to the nearest final exit rather than 
selecting the nearest vomitory and moving around the concourse as is observed in an actual 
egress. This accounts for some of the variations between the observed and simulated usage of 
egress path 18. If there had been more final exits evenly placed about the stadium the effect of 
shortest route selection would have been less pronounced and the simulation would have more 
closely matched reality. Stadia are generally built with a few very wide final exits rather than 
many smaller ones in order to better utilise space, and direct flow. 
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Simulation data Smoothed average of simulation data Actual Data Smoothed actual data
Total simulated egress:112 people
Total actual egress: 441 people
 
Figure 62: Egress Path 018 – specific flow as a function of time
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Complete evacuation simulation of a stadium using Simulex32.exe:  
Vomitory B_18 (label in model simulation) is shown with its associated area of the 
bowl and concourse, 10 minutes and 34 seconds after evacuation was initiated (figures 
63, 64 and 65). The dots represent people as if viewed from above. Approximately one 
third of the stadium had evacuated at this point. The total time for this evacuation 
simulation was over 38 minutes. The stadium on which this simulation was based often 
clears in less than ten minutes following a rugby game and its anticipated evacuation 
time is less than eight minutes.  
 
Figure 63: The vomitory is represented as stairs with Link 63 linking to the bowl and Link 64 linking to the 
concourse. 
 
Figure 64: In the bowl patrons are visibly congregating around the vomitories with vomitories closer to the 
exits attracting a greater share of the population. 
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Figure 65: The concourse shows people flow from Vomitory B18 and a neighbouring vomitory into the stream 
of evacuating patrons.  
In order to facilitate the software, the floor plan of the stadium was modified. This is 
most obvious where seats have been removed from the bowl area (figure 64). Bottle-
necks are visible where aisles open into the vomitory areas. Simplifications made to 
other areas of the floor plan included the exclusion of furniture and other obstacles from 
dining and lounge areas and removal of barriers in hallways that connect corporate 
suites. This was done so as to shorten path lengths and improve utilisation of stairwells.  
 
The graph on the following page (figure 66) shows the specific flow values across all 
exits from the stadium. It is of note that the time taken for this simulated egress was 
over twice that recorded following the observed football game at this stadium. Other 
data obtained from the simulation regarding usage of paths was also unrealistic in that 
extreme queuing occurred and conflicting flows were generated where merging flows 
normally occur.  
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Moving average per minute Raw data
Time observed egress 
completed (14 minutes)
 
Figure 66: Exitways – simulated specific flow as a function of time 
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6 Analysis and Discussion 
Analysis and discussion of the findings of this study have been divided into three 
sections:  
 
• general observations about stadium considerations for egress management and 
fire protection 
• comparison of results obtained from different egress paths calculations and 
simulations 
• a discussion of software limitations that were encountered and their 
implications. 
 
6.1 General observations 
In observing egress and operational management at stadia, in both Australia and New 
Zealand, it was found that all stadia have developed or adopted some components of fire 
protection and or egress management that work particularly well. That being said many 
also have some components that could be improved. All stadia are different because of 
their location, design history and functionality but some general observations can be 
made regarding fire protection, egress movement and management, and the hazards 
associated with fires at stadia. 
6.1.1 Stadium considerations for egress management and fire protection 
In general fire protection and evacuation procedures are the domain of stadium 
operations managers in New Zealand and Australia. Almost half of these contract out 
the role to security, health and safety or building compliance organisations. This 
delegation of control to an external agency has in the past, and may in the future, lead to 
problems with emergency egress management. This problem arises because stewarding 
staff may not have a suitable working knowledge of documented evacuation procedures. 
Similarly they may not be aware of the influence of actions, such as locking certain 
gates, may have on the effectiveness of an evacuation. This problem has been identified 
at a number of stadia. Management at these stadia have responded to try and minimise 
this problem by encouraging a greater degree of communication and consultation 
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between the agencies that coordinate stewardship, normal operational procedures and 
emergency procedures.  
 
Some stadia have taken this a step further by assigning stewardship of an area to the 
same stewards each time. By doing this, stewards become particularly familiar with 
their area and what is required to facilitate safe egress through it. As stewardship in 
many areas may only be required 10-12 hours a month it can take some time for a 
steward to appreciate crowd movement through an area, emergency egress plans for that 
area and features that must be monitored and maintained. These features include fire 
doors that get jammed open, emergency gates that become obstructed by vehicles, 
cabling or being locked and fire protection devices that are commonly tampered with. 
 
All but one of the stadia viewed use an emergency warning intercommunication system 
(EWIS). This has enhanced the relationship between stewardship and emergency 
operations. EWIS allows operations to direct investigation of incidents and emergency 
movement by integrating information flow to stewarding staff and to the public. This is 
further enhanced by the ability to use television screens around the stadium to provide 
information and instruction to patrons. 
 
Management considerations regarding the logistics and implications of evacuations are 
greater than they were in the past. This is partially due to facilitating a range of event 
types with differing evacuation needs and partially due to the delegation of crowd 
management to contractors. The implications of interrupting live television broadcasts 
also plays a role in evacuation planning for some stadia. This has led to the evolution of 
two types of evacuation strategy. Some stadia adopt a total evacuation policy whereas 
others have developed partial and or staged evacuation schemes. Both strategies have 
their advantages. 
 
One of the issues with total evacuations is where to put the people. Many stadia do not 
have large areas of land attached to them adjacent to the stadium. Unlike the end of a 
game or event when people move away from the stadium, evacuated patrons require 
assembly or muster areas to wait while the cause of the evacuation is attended to. If no 
suitable areas are available then surrounding roads may become blocked as traffic is 
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disrupted by the crowd. Few stadia would consider bringing patrons onto the arena for a 
number of reasons: 
 
• The arena is often protected from wind by the surrounding stands and may 
expose occupants to smoke and radiant heat hazards from a large fire. 
• Arenas are not designed to accommodate mass movement into or out of them. 
• The pitch can be damaged by trampling. 
 
Other issues include the implications of stopping an event. Disrupting events and 
televised broadcasts for false alarms can have flow on effects for stadium selection in 
hosting future events. 
 
The advantages of a total evacuation are based on its simplicity: 
 
• It is easy to communicate instructions to occupants. 
• It is very similar to the movement that occurs during normal egress. 
 
In contrast, staged evacuations or partial evacuations provide more options. A partial 
evacuation involves selected zones within a stadium moving at different times. The 
most vulnerable zone is evacuated first, then if necessary the adjoining zones. A staged 
evacuation works the same way but involves evacuating zones until the stadium is 
empty. This is an extreme version of a partial evacuation. 
 
The disadvantages of a partial evacuation are that it: 
 
• Requires greater training of stewarding staff. 
• It is more complex than a total evacuation. 
• Involves giving different messages to different occupants. 
• Is quite different to normal stadium egress and has greater potential for 
confusion. 
• May be hard to initiate if the game is still in play and no obvious signs of danger 
are apparent to occupants. 
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Its advantages are that: 
 
• The most vulnerable patrons can be focussed on and removed from the danger 
quickly. 
• There is less initial disruption to the majority of patrons 
• People in surrounding zones can be prepared to move, reducing their 
premovement time. 
• People can initially be evacuated to other areas of the stadium reducing the need 
for large muster or assembly areas. 
• Disruption to the event is minimised. 
 
Both strategies have their uses, although the partial evacuation affords greater flexibility 
and may be perceived as more desirable from a management perspective. 
 
Other management related issues of concern that were identified in the course of this 
study were:  
 
• Staff awareness - Contractors are used to perform a wide range of functions at 
stadia. This is because of the vast difference between event and non event 
requirements. Staff awareness of emergency procedures varied between stadia. 
By questioning stewarding staff and other staff on evacuation procedures it was 
established that some stadia go to great effort to ensure staff are prepared for 
evacuations whereas others do not, relying on contractors to brief their staff on 
the day. At a number of stadia staff were seen locking gates, and restricting the 
clear width of exit ways while they took breaks. When questioned, these staff 
were unaware of the implications of their actions. Fire doors were jammed open 
and gates were opened into the oncoming crowds. At one stadium management 
removed and confiscated door jams from the same fire door three times. This 
type of practice was not true of all stadia. Some stadia provided staff with maps 
of evacuation routes for their areas and routinely quizzed the personnel on 
evacuation procedures and the importance of maintaining clear routes. One 
stadium insisted that all contract security staff (hired by the stadium or event 
organisers) familiarise themselves with the entire grounds, evacuation 
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procedures and all exits before they were permitted to perform any security or 
ushering tasks. 
 
• Maintenance - Although the majority of areas in visited stadia were in good 
condition, some venues included areas that had been poorly maintained or only 
partially modified. These neglected areas were found predominantly in sections 
of older stadium buildings. The level of maintenance afforded these structures 
varied.  
 
Problems identified included: 
o poor maintenance records of fire protection devices 
o unsprinklered corporate levels  
o Fire protection systems that had been disconnected from the fire service.  
o Disconnected manual call points in hallways  
o Structural protection had not been maintained in areas that were out of sight 
(see example in figure 67).  
o Rubbish and broken furniture that had been allowed to accumulate or stored 
in gaps behind older stands.  
 
 
Figure 67 Poorly maintained structural protection of I beam in hallway between suites and players area 
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All of these problems have the potential to impact on preventing fires from occurring or 
reducing fire spread within the stadium and ensuring life safety. In some stadia 
management were aware of the problems and in others they had not noticed the 
deterioration. In either case greater care in maintaining the structures and equipment is 
warranted. 
6.1.2 Design of vomitories - crossed flow and congestion 
Vomitories at stadia differ considerably. Only in new structures have vomitories been 
designed as shown in figures 70 and 71. In some stadia the ability to accommodate extra 
seating has determined the shape of the vomitory. An example of this is shown in figure 
68.  
 
In figure 68 flow from one direction (the left) is severely restricted while flow from the 
opposite direction (the right) has preference. In this instance it took in excess of 20 
minutes for this part of the stadium to clear. Management indicated that it was not 




Figure 68: Crossed flow crowd movement – people 




Figure 69: Sketch of cross flow movement 
directions. 
As mentioned previously attempts to model evacuation of this part of the stadium were 
beyond the capabilities of the software used due to the complexity of movement. Figure 
69 attempts to explain this – it is a 90-degree anti-clockwise rotation of figure 68. The 
right-hand angle at the T-junction is obtuse and the left-hand angle is acute. Although 
the left-hand flow has the advantage in accessing this vomitory, other vomitories further 
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to the left are less obstructed. People from the right move directly against the flow from 
the left in an effort to reach other vomitories. This slows movement from the left and 
further inhibits flow from the right.  
 
The gridlock observed at this vomitory was more extreme than at any other egress point 
in any of the studied stadia. Although other stadia did not experience this degree of 
crossed flow congestion during normal egress there were areas where crossed flow 
crowd movement did occur. This serves to show how congestion in one small area of a 
stadium can have implications on the effective egress of a large part of the structure. 
The only way to facilitate an evacuation for this type of layout would be to stagger the 
evacuation. Patrons to the left and the right of the vomitory would have to be evacuated 
in two separate stages in order to prevent gridlock. This is not currently part of the 
evacuation plan for the stadium. The current plan is for a complete evacuation which in 
this area is inappropriate. 
 
Figure 70: Ideal vomitory sizing 
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Figure 71: Ideal vomitory egress flow 
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6.1.3 The potential for smoke hazards to affect egress at New Zealand Stadia 
Having viewed stadia throughout New Zealand it could be assumed that smoke 
emissions from a fire represents a minimal hazard to the majority of patrons. This is 
primarily due to the size and open layout of these structures. Smoke layer height in 
concourses and enclosed areas may be assumed to only present a problem once the layer 
is lower than 2m. In the majority of cases this is unlikely to occur due to high ceilings 
and open layouts.  
 
The bowl 
It is possible for smoke hazards to occur under adverse wind conditions within the bowl 
of a stadium but only in an extremely large fire. The stadium most vulnerable to this has 
a completely enclosed arena with no vertical breaks between stands. The nominal 
distance between the back row of seating and the ceiling of the bowl roof was not found 
to be less than 2.2 metres in any of the stadia visited. This distance increased 0.2-0.4m 
each successive row toward the field. A person would have to remain in the back row 
while the wind blew smoke towards them to be significantly affected by smoke. 
 
Concourses 
In the observed concourses ceilings typically sloped, mirroring the rise in seating within 
the bowl. The height of ceilings varied and the majority were open to the outside 
allowing free ventilation of smoke. Only one stadium has a fully enclosed concourse. 
The height of the ceiling was approximately 9m at its peak. The volume of this 
concourse exceeds 20,000 cubic metres. The concourse is almost entirely concrete and 
steel. Rubbish bins represent the greatest fire loading within the concourse. Considering 
the size of the concourse a rubbish bin fire should not present a significant hazard.  
 
Suites, lounges and restaurants 
The only areas of the observed stadia that are vulnerable to fire and smoke hazards are 
the furnished areas such as suites and lounges. These are not normally accessible to the 
general admission patrons and occupancy levels are lower than for the rest of the 
stadium. Smoke accumulation in these areas would not pose a problem for the majority 
of evacuees from a stadium but it could pose difficulties to a minority, such as those in 
the approximate vicinity of a fire, given certain conditions.  
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The realisation of smoke and fire hazards in furnished areas was documented by 
Isner131. The Texas City Stadium fire produced conditions where smoke accumulated in 
hallways potentially blocking egress from surrounding suites. The possibility for this 
type of incident to occur exists in many New Zealand stadia. The majority of stadia 
have narrow corridors in the executive levels not dissimilar to those described by Isner. 
A predisposition for catering staff and media personnel to jam fire doors open to ease 
access for trolleys and cables creates a suitable environment for the type of smoke 
inundation that occurred at Texas City Stadium. Education of the implications of these 
types of action are the best way to change this behaviour.  
6.2 Observations specific to crowd flow and egress 
There are two ways to compare the obtained egress results: 
 
1. Observed values can be compared between one another. 
2. Observed values can be compared within the context of other studies and 
simulations. In order to compare observed values within this context values 
obtained from applying standard calculations and documented movement trends 
have been used. 
6.2.1 Egress Flows 
The most striking outcome from the results is the wide variation in specific flow values 
(figures 72 and 73) that were observed. Maximum specific flows range between 1.98 
people per second per metre effective width down to 0.71 people per second per metre 
effective width. On the surface this would appear to be quite a difference but upon 
examination it is clear that the lowest values are for egress path 1, which never reached 
sufficient densities for specific flow to be optimised, and for egress path 8, which 
experienced the highest density at its maximum specific flow of any of the path ways. 
By discounting these two results the range is narrowed to 1.55-1.98 people per second 
per metre effective width. All of these values are higher than predicted by recommended 
maximum specific flow values in Chapter 13 of the SFPE handbook132.  
 
In comparing the densities of the different walkways (figure 76) there are several 
interesting features. Firstly, egress path 18 has a notably lower density at maximum 
specific flow rate than the other egress paths. It was observed that people moved very 
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quickly from this vomitory although speeds were not obtained. It was asserted that this 
may have been because of the distance that this vomitory was from the main exit. This 
would imply a speed close to that observed in egress path 4. The next most obvious 
feature is that three egress paths experienced the same density at maximum specific 
flow. This is particularly interesting because each of these egress paths was quite 
different; one was a staircase, one was a narrowing path and one was a concourse with 
mixed flow movements. Each of these situations had the potential to create higher than 
usual densities. This indicates that high densities may not inhibit crowd speeds 
markedly until they become very high. The third point of note is the wide range of 
densities observed for maximum specific flows. Once again this indicates that flow rates 
are quite robust across a range of densities and speeds. 
 
The sustained specific flows show greater variation than the maximum specific flow 
rates (figure 74). This may in some cases be due to a supply of alternate routes allowing 
diversion of occupant flow from the monitored egress paths to other paths, lowering the 
density of the observed flow. In other cases the speed with which a sustained specific 
flow was established may have played a greater role in determining the observed 
sustained specific flow. 
 
Comparing calculated flows of different egress paths (figure 75) does not provide much 
meaningful information as paths had different effective widths. These values only 
become meaningful when compared to calculated values using standard accepted 
maximum specific flows. 
 
The variations in speeds are only significant in the fact that relatively high speeds were 
achieved. The highest speed observed, 2.7m/s, was a slow jog. This was observed at a 
low density egress path. The remainder of maximum speeds (figure 77) and mean 
speeds (figure 78) vary from slow to moderate walking speeds. 
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Figure 72: Comparison of maximum specific flow rates for different egress paths 
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Figure 73: Comparison of sustained specific flow rates for different egress paths 
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Figure 74: Comparison of maximum and sustained specific flow rates for different egress paths 
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Figure 75: Comparison of calculated flow rates for different egress paths 
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Figure 76: Comparison of densities for different egress paths at maximum specific flow rates 
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Figure 77: Comparison of maximum speeds for different egress paths 
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Where density is known for speeds 
the mean density is given in brackets. 
Units are people/metre squared.
 
Figure 78: Comparison of mean speeds for different egress paths 
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6.2.2 Observations from simulation and data flow calculations 
Having compared egress movement between different pathways at stadia it is appropriate to put 
this into the context of recognised crowd movement for more general situations. 
 




Crowd flow on walkways (figure 79) plots maximum specific flow against density from 
literature with maximum and sustained specific flows from this study. The observed maximum 
specific flow rates were generally much greater than Fruin’s level of service suggests. The 
maximum specific flow rate results are however consistent with Poyner et al and Ando et al’s 
research into specific flows at stadia and train stations respectively. Ando et al purport that once 
a high density crowd is achieved the density has a diminished effect on flow rates. The Green 
Guide suggests an optimum specific flow rate of 1.82 people/s/m effective width but notes that 
higher values can be achieved. This is consistent with what was observed. 
 
The mean specific flow rates observed, with the exception of egress path 8; do appear to loosely 
correlate to Fruin’s observations for maximum specific flow although they are still higher. There 
appears to be little correlation between the observed mean rates and those predicted by 
Simulex32 or Predtechenski’s work although there are insufficient data points to completely 
discount this. Within the context of these other researchers observations, the results from this 
study tend to suggest that stadium crowds move more rapidly and at higher densities than more 
general crowds. 
 
Insufficient data was collected to identify a trend for stairway movement (figure 80). Only one 
stairway produced results that could be compared to that of existing research. It is possible that 
the data from egress path 7 could indicate adherence to Fruin’s observations but in the absence of 
other data this cannot be stated with any conviction. It can be said that specific flow rates on 
stairs at stadia can be achieved at a higher than predicted rate. 
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Figure 79: Specific flow values for walkways from the literature and from this study 
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Crowd Flow in Stairwells
EP7 - sustained specific flow
































Figure 80: Specific flow values for stairs from the literature and from this study 
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Comparison of calculated flow rates (figure 81) were achieved using equation 6 and maximum 
specific flow rates from the Green Guide133 and the SFPE Handbook134. In six of the eight egress 
paths the calculated flow rates were within 10% of the values suggested using the Green Guide 
(Poyner et al’s work). In only two instances was the SFPE prediction (Fruin’s work) within 10% 
of the observed calculated flow. In two cases, egress paths 1 and 8, the calculated flow using 
observed data was lower than either prediction. Egress path 1 was under utilised and so this is 
expected and egress path 8 had too great a density to produce an optimum specific flow value for 
calculated flow. This tends to suggest that the Green Guide is a more appropriate document for 
calculating flows at stadia than the SFPE Handbook. It also reinforces the observation that 
stadium crowd movement is not the same as more general crowd movement. 
 
In plotting observed speeds and densities over established speed density curves it can be seen 
that the correlation between density and speed holds (figure 82, 83) although once again there is 
insufficient data to confidently quantify this. Speeds do appear to be greater than those suggested 
in the SFPE handbook135 for given densities. Work by Ando et al136 may explain this. Mean 
speeds have been shown by Ando et al to vary with age and sex as well as density. Ando et al 
found young males to produce the highest speeds at measured densities. The observed results 
from New Zealand stadia may well be influenced by the predominance of this demographic 
amongst stadium crowd patrons. 
 
Further studies of flow rates at stadia are needed so as to better map out speed-density and 
specific flow-density relationships for stadium crowds. It may be found that specific flows for 
stadium crowds remain fairly constant across a band of densities as suggested by Smith137. This 
would indicate that the maximum achievable specific flows for stadia are determined not so 
much by density but by demographics and sociology. Observations of Egress path 23 would tend 
to support this hypothesis. Individuals observed outside of the stadium exhibited different 
characteristics to those inside the stadium. This may be part of the reason that they are able to 
move more rapidly than other crowds. 
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Fc = Fs We, 
Poyner uses Fs = 1.8
Fruin uses Fs = 1.4
Observational uses Fs calculated from observational data
 
Figure 81: Comparison of calculated flows for different egress paths 
- 145 - 
 
















k=1.4 (flat) k=1.8 (flat) Data - flat (4) Data - flat (10) Data - flat (2) Data - flat (14)
 
Figure 82: Movement rate as a function of density for walkways 
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k=1.08 (stair) Data - stairs (3-unimpeded)) Data - stairs (7)
 
Figure 83: Movement rate as a function of density for stairs
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6.3 Software limitations 
Modelling human behaviour is not an easy task. Human behaviour is complex and 
varies with environments. The software that was used to simulate egress at stadia 
simplifies some of the behavioural patterns apparent in crowd movement. In less 
complex applications this would not be a problem but in this application it was. 
Consequently evacuation times obtained in using the software are dissimilar to those 
times observed by timing crowds. The flow profiles determined by established 
researchers show wide variations between each other and observations from this study. 
As Simulex32 is based on some of this research it makes sense that Simulex32s results 
also differ from that which was observed.  
 
Problems that were encountered are not necessarily specific to Simulex32. These 
problems may well be encountered when trying to apply other software to occupancies 
on the scale of stadia. The problems encountered do serve to illustrate that a modelling 
program that is highly suitable for application to some occupancies is not necessarily 
suitable for application to all occupancies. Although many problems were encountered 
this should not reflect upon Simulex32s capabilities to handle other types of occupancy. 
Information on software limitations is only included in order to illustrate aspects of 
modelling that may lead to variations from observed flow movement. 
 
In simplifying behavioural characteristics the software used did not allow for the 
following: 
 
Wheelchairs and mobility impaired patrons – As found by results from egress path 3 
(figure 83) mobility impaired patrons have the potential to significantly impact localised 
crowd flow at corners and other congestion points. Sporting events such as the Para 
Olympics or other events such as Papal visits or concerts that attract a predominantly 
elderly population will have a greater distribution of these people. Venues that intend to 
cater to these types of population need to be able to consider these impacts on their 
evacuation planning.  














Grouping of individuals within the crowd – Rugby games are typically attended by 
groups of people. These groups may consist of a family unit, friends or a tour party. The 
sizes vary from 3-4 to 10-20. Different types of group will have different levels of 
cohesion. In an ingress or egress situation individuals within these groups attempt to 
maintain contact with each other. This often results in the group moving more slowly 
than the rest of the crowd. The front people move slowly to enable the back people to 
keep up and the rest of the group constantly shuffles against the crowd in an effort to 
maintain group integrity. If the group becomes separated then either individuals stop to 
wait for the others or both factions fight the crowd in order to reunite. The prevalence of 
this type of movement is determined by the event. In assigned seating situations this 
type of action may not be as dominant as for festival seating due to the structure 
assigned seating provides.  
 
Group type movement is in contradiction to “ball-bearing/cellular automata” egress 
models. This may make them inappropriate for modelling social venues. Social events 
such as rugby or concerts produce much greater internal group characteristics than other 
types of crowd that are modelled. To draw a greater distinction, commuter crowds (e.g. 
trains) attract very little grouping phenomenon. Although models such as Simulex32 
may accommodate this in determining average flow rates, the behavioural pattern is not 
exhibited when simulations are performed.  
 
Figure 84: Altruistic behaviour decreasing effective width of egress path 
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Reverse flow – In the evacuation of a high-rise, unidirectional flow occurs in the 
direction of the exit. With stadia, once the concourse is reached there are often multiple 
exits available. Stadia occupy large spaces. Should a person exit at the wrong point they 
would potentially have to walk around the outside of the grounds in order to get to the 
place they intended. People are therefore inclined to try and leave through a 
predetermined exit rather than the nearest one.  
 
Many studies of human behaviour and fires show a predisposition to leaving the way 
that was entered. It is hypothesised that this may account for the relatively high 
calculated flow exhibited by Egress path 4. As observed in Egress path 2 and 4 people 
will move in different directions within the concourse rather than simply radiating from 
the structure. Other instances of reverse flow occur when people attempt to evacuate 
toward the danger. Due to the size of stadia it is possible that egressing crowds may 
initially move toward a hazard and then attempt to reverse directions. This type of 
movement initiated the Ibrox disaster. Having the ability for individuals to reverse 
direction motion themselves based on queuing would have improved the performance of 
the simulations that were performed. 
 
Sloped floors – Simulex32 allows for flat surfaces and stairs. Many stadia have ramps 
as well as flat surfaces and stairs. These may be for wheelchair access or for more 
general use. In either case the rate of movement on a ramp is not the same as for a stair 
or for a flat surface and the population density and speed accommodated on a ramp is 
greater than that of a stairwell. In the simulations run as part of this study stairs were 
used in place of ramps. In general, sloped pathways are treated as level surfaces rather 
than as stairs. This is difficult to do and increases the complexity of the model when 
attempted in Simulex32. It is therefore easier to treat ramps as stairs. This may not be 
appropriate but it reduces the incidence of the model “people” malfunctioning. 
 
Drunken behaviour – various behavioural anomalies may be observed in sports or 
other social crowds distinct from offices or general places of public assembly. The most 
notable of these is drunken behaviour. Drunken behaviour features more predominantly 
for stadia than for most other structures (excluding public houses). Drunken patrons 
have initiated stadium stampedes through fighting and disorderly behaviour. Alcohol 
may potentially impact on a person’s ability to react appropriately to an evacuation 
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signal. Behaviour of inebriated individuals during an evacuation may include slow 
movement, surging, falling over and moving against the crowd. Evacuating such 
individuals may require assistance of staff not only to initiate their movement but also to 
escort them to safety. Euphoric fans may exhibit similar behaviour after a victory. 
Video footage at Bradford in 1985 showed an apparent lack of awareness of anything 
other than the outcome of the game by many fans. The somewhat random behaviour of 
drunks during an evacuation is not considered in Simulex32. The ability to model this 
type of behaviour may also be suitable for modelling of sleeping accommodation 
occupancies when awakened people may not behave as logically as they normally 
would. 
 
Conflict Avoidance - Simulex32 will allow people to bump into each other and shuffle. 
This action sometimes jostles individuals free of a conflict. Other times individuals 
repeatedly bang into each other and the model has to be rerun. In reality this behaviour 
is almost never observed. People will move sideways or give way to each other. This 
type of conflict avoidance occurs on a regular basis in the general population especially 
where multiple flows merge. The inability to resolve or avoid such conflicts in 
modelling means that simulation of vomitories is severely inhibited.  
 
Front to back communication – Many crowd-crushing instances occur as the result of 
poor front-to-back communication. Front-to-back or back-to-front communication refers 
to communication between those at the front and the back of a crowd. If for some 
reason an exit is blocked, those people at the front cannot get out but those people at the 
back are unaware. People at the back continue to push forward resulting in increased 
pressure on the front people. This culminates in either the blockage giving way or 
people becoming asphyxiated and injured by the pressure. In Simulex32, as the density 
of the crowd increases people slow down and eventually stop. There is no simulation of 
pressure build up as movement ceases once the inter-person distance reaches 
approximately 30cm. 
 
Obscured vision such as at night or in smoke – Simulex32 makes no environmental 
considerations in determining travelling speed. Movement is determined solely by 
density and terrain.  
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Other variables that need to be considered are: 
 
• Obscuration to vision by smoke or poor lighting 
• Factors that affect a person’s respiratory function; such as smoke and distance 
travelled.  
 
Most people should not be affected by the distance to traverse half a stadium but, if they 
are travelling through light smoke the demands on their respiratory system may impact 
on their speed.  
 
Poor visibility will contribute to a slow travelling speed. Poor visibility can occur 
through smoke obscuration affecting the visible distance and impacting on the effective 
illumination from lighting, or blackout conditions. Either of these may occur during a 
fire. In enclosed concourses and stairwells this is a greater issue than for outdoor areas.  
 
Logic decisions such as line of sight and alternate exit selection – In many cases it is 
easier to travel farther to reach a destination more quickly. In modelling stadia in 
Simulex32, people always seek the shortest path regardless of how many others are in 
their way. This means that some stairways and pathways are over utilised and others are 
not used at all.  
 
Evacuation times were greatly affected by path utilisation. This highlighted the 
importance of decision making in evacuation models. It can be observed in many 
situations that people have low tolerance for queuing. When an alternate path is in line 
of sight people will switch. An example of this is supermarket queues. Simulex32 does 
not accommodate changes in path choice. Distance maps determine the shortest distance 
to the exit and this is the path that is taken by people in the model.  
 
An emergency such as a fire is artificially modelled by blocking off an area. All 
occupants automatically “know” this and seek the next shortest distance map. 
Backtracking or avoiding congestion is not possible in the model. 
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7 Conclusions and Recommendations 
New Zealand stadia are not markedly different to stadia in other parts of the world. The 
only major differences are that New Zealand stadia are relatively small, because of the 
smaller population base, and crowd management is not as comprehensively regulated as 
in some countries. Stadium profiles range from older type structures through to modern 
structures that are in line with modern stadia found in Australia. The trend towards 
multifunctionality of stadia is common to many stadia in New Zealand and elsewhere. 
This has led to greater quantities of furnishing, electronics and catering than was evident 
in the past. In upgrading stadia to accommodate these additions fire protection has also 
been upgraded. There are however areas of some stadia that have not been structurally 
altered but have been developed to facilitate different usage patterns than were 
originally intended. In these structures there is a need for greater fire protection.  
 
In comparing observational data, recommended values, and simulation modelling for 
stadia, it is apparent that there is some disparity between them. As anticipated, the 
results obtained from comparing standard egress movement values, simulations and 
observed egress movement do show stadium egress movement to be unique. Standard 
methods of anticipating egress movement when applied to stadia appear to be more 
conservative than actual movement. Although this study only produced a small sample 
of egress values for stadia it produced sufficient results as to determine that crowd 
movement at stadia is a special case and as such may warrant special consideration with 
regards to anticipating egress requirements.  
 
Unfortunately consistency from observational data sets was insufficient to confidently 
isolate specific egress movement relationships for stadia based on effective width and 
density. This is may be attributable to a number of variables. These variables include 
experimental error, time of day (lighting), outcome of the game, variation in effective 
widths and weather conditions. An insufficient quantity of data was collected to isolate 
which variables played a significant role in influencing the observed movements. Other 
researchers have found wide variations in density for specific flows on flat surfaces138 
so the variations observed are not uncharacteristic for densely packed crowds. Further 
study of densely packed, large scale entertainment crowds is needed to quantify the 
egress movement relationships for stadia and determine whether these relationships are 
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common to other densely populated, large scale entertainment venues such as indoor 
arenas. 
 
In most of the observed egresses in this study crowd movement was expeditious. This 
implies that for the most part egress is managed appropriately and safe, timely 
evacuations should be achievable. Stadium management with the fastest clearance times 
achieved this through attempting to meet the goal of an eight minute evacuation. Stadia 
with longer evacuation times had no such goal. The recommendation of a standard 
acceptable evacuation time for stadia might be helpful in encouraging all stadia to 
improve their egress capabilities. 
 
The occupant profile observed in this study varied from that observed in other crowded 
environments by other researchers. The implication of this is that crowd movement 
varies with the type of crowd. This emphasises the importance of trial evacuations or 
profiling of crowds in anticipating actual movement rates for different types of 
occupancy so as to ensure that appropriate egress times can be and are achieved. In this 
case the standard movement profiles in the SFPE handbook and the simulation software 
that was used underestimate egress movement, ergo it is likely that in other instances 
standard movement profiles may over estimate egress movement.  
 
Consideration of specific crowd profiles such as mobility impairment may warrant 
special consideration in evacuation planning. Based on the observations of the 
formation of temporal congestion by slow moving patrons, egress planning should 
include the potential impact large numbers of elderly or disabled patrons could have on 
evacuations. This does not apply to all stadia, but those hosting disabled sporting events 
or events targeting the mature generation should consider the implications of this 
demographic on evacuation efficacy. 
 
There is wide variation in the understanding and implementation of evacuation 
requirements and application of fire protection at New Zealand’s main stadia. The role 
management plays is key in affecting appropriate measures to ensure the safety of 
patrons in the event of a significant fire. Because alerting and fire protection systems are 
closely linked to effective evacuation, structures that accommodate large scale 
populations need to consider this in developing crowd management strategies. The 
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variation in the level of fire protection afforded to and evacuation planning between 
stadia indicate that greater guidance is required in order to ensure a consistent minimum 
acceptable level of safety is provided to patrons. Currently no such guidance is provided 
in New Zealand for buildings accommodating very high numbers of occupants.  
 
Stadium management have applied an ad hoc adoption of overseas guidelines and other 
documents in conjunction with occupational safety inputs in order to meet the 
requirements of the building code and manage normal occupant usage. There is no 
policing of this and inconsistencies and compromises to the intent of adopted documents 
can be found at a number of stadia. Adoption or recommendation of a common 
guideline such as the Green Guide would assist in consolidating crowd management and 
evacuation policies in a way that provides a consistent level of protection to patrons in 
fire and other situations as per the intent of the Acceptable Solutions in the Approved 
Document for New Zealand Building Code and the Fire Safety and Evacuation of 
Buildings Regulations.  
 
The suitability of modelling software must be carefully considered when applied to 
determining evacuation requirements or performance at large scale structures with high 
numbers of occupants such as stadia. It should not be assumed that modelling software 
that is suitable for smaller structures will deliver meaningful results for all types and 
sizes of occupancies. An understanding of, and appreciation for software limitations, as 
well as an appreciation for the types of crowd movement associated with the structure to 
be modelled, must be held by the modeller in order to determine the viability of 
simulation outputs in application to the actual structure. The software used in this study 
was not suitable for application to stadia but did provide an excellent learning tool in 








8.1 Appendix A – Glossary 
Term Definition 
Arena  Area enclosed by stands e.g. playing field. 
CIMS Coordinated Incident Management System as used by the emergency
services and others in coordinating multi agency response efforts to
both emergency and non-emergency events 
Concessions Temporary or permanent retail outlets located within the grounds.
These typically sell, memorabilia, food and beverages. Those selling
food and beverages typically manufacture or prepare some of  the food
and beverages within the concession area. 
Concourse The walkways within the stadium that permit access to the various
seating areas 
Control Room Room from which security, police, ambulance and sometimes other
services are commanded during an event. Video surveillance and
intercoms are usually based in this room. This room may contain a
mimic fire panel. 
Egress The process of leaving the venue 
Embankment Sloping area for festival seating 
Emergency Abnormal situation requiring response by emergency services in order
to re-establish order or preserve safety of individuals 
Event For the purpose of this document an event indicates a scheduled activity 
that takes place in a stadium, primarily the arena, to which patrons
attend e.g. rugby game. 
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Festival seating Area in which no seats are provided and people are be able to sit on the 
ground or stand. Permanent festival seating areas often consist of
grassed or concrete terraces or embankments with crush barriers
interspersed. These may have aisles but do not have vomitories or roofs. 
Festival seating at concerts is often provided in the area in front of the
stage. Exits are either at the front and/or back and/or sides of the
festival seating area. 
Full time Signal that ends a game of sport. 
Grounds The entire property within which the stadium is located 
Incident Unscheduled activity within the grounds that disrupts
viewing/attendance of the event by patrons or the occurrence of the
event itself e.g. a fire. An incident may lead to an emergency.  
Ingress The process if entering the venue 
Lounge Open plan room, usually fully furnished with carpet, a variety of fabrics
and furniture items, containing a licensed bar. Access to these areas is
usually controlled by security. 
Media Suite Area in which the media is based during an event. Usually unfurnished 
but will contain many power outputs. On an event day such rooms
usually contain large amounts of cables, photographic equipment,
catering facilities, backdrops and makeup stations. These suites contain
large viewing panels facing the arena. In many stadia these viewing 
panels may be opened. 
Patrons Those people attending the venue for the sole purpose of viewing the
event. 
Private Suite Viewing room and/or section of the stand that is either owned or leased
by private individuals. These suites may be occupied outside of event 
hours. Private suites are typically furnished by the owner or leasee and
may contain plush furnishings. Catering and bar facilities are typically
included in the suite during an event. 
Restaurant Similar to a lounge but with table and chair seating and catering. This 
may include facilities for heating food. Food preparation may or may
not occur in an adjoining area.  
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Stadium Arena, surrounding stands, concourse and vomitories 
Staff Contractors, stadium employees or volunteers performing a function at 
the venue that contributes to the event. 
Steward Anyone whose main occupation is to direct the crowd or members of
the crowd into or out of the stadium. This includes caterers but excludes
concessionaries 
Terraces Sloping area for festival seating 
Venue Site on which an event occurs and attendees have access to. May or
may not include the entire grounds. 
Viewing panels Windows facing the arena. Usually made of glass or plastic. Sometimes
these panels can be opened. Panels typically include windows between 
adjoining suites so as to increase the view. 
Vomitories Access routes into and out of the stands 
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8.2 Appendix B – Interviews  
Survey Questions – The stadium questions were asked at all stadia that were visited. 
The Fire service questions were asked where it was possible. More than one person may 
have been required to answer all the questions in either section of the survey. 
8.2.1 Questionnaire 
Name of Venue:   
Date of Interview:   
Stadium Questions 
Event at Stadium:   
Crowd attendance: 
Reason for limited capacity attendance (if applicable): 
Typical time for crowd to clear grounds following event: 
Are there normally any difficulties in clearing the grounds? If so what and why? 
Has your fire protection system ever been compromised by deliberate acts or otherwise? 
Elaborate. 
Do you have an operations centre? 
Who is involved in the operations centre? (Job title, experience and training) 
What other roles are performed with respect to crowd safety, egress and crowd 
behaviour prior to /during/after the event? 
Do you have any concerns about the way operations may perform in an emergency 
situation such as a fire? 
When was your evacuation plan last evaluated? 
When was your fire protection system last evaluated? 
Do you believe these plans and systems are of an acceptable standard? 
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Smoke control  
Extinguishment 
Access for fire service 
Do you have any fire service or response teams on site during an event? 
What problems do you normally face during an event? 
If there is a power cut how does this affect your fire protection system? 
Are you familiar with CIMS? What provision is there for using staff under emergency 
situations within CIMS by the lead agency? 
If an aspect of your fire protection system is isolated how long does it take to bring it 
back on line? 
Are there any aspects of your stadium that people have questioned with regards to fire 
safety and egress?  
If so what are they and what is your answer to their questions? 
What impact does live television broadcasting have on your willingness and or ability to 
stop a game and or evacuate the stadium? 
Do you believe that your stadium can be evacuated expeditiously and safely if required? 
The information gathered in this survey can remain anonymous if required. 
Is it acceptable to name the stadium this data refers to in my thesis? 
Is there certain data you do not want attributed specifically to this stadium? 
If not, then this information shall be attributed to one (or more) stadium(s). 
Fire Service Questions  
What is your fire service role in relation to the stadium? 
Are you familiar with the stadium? 
How often do you visit the stadium during event time?  
During non event time? 
What do you anticipate as your response time during a scheduled event? 
At the end of a scheduled event? 
Are you familiar with the stadiums emergency plans as they relate to fire service 
attendance? 
Do you have any concerns about the stadium from a fire fighting perspective? 
Do you believe the stadium could be evacuated expeditiously and safely if required? 
- 160 - 
 
8.2.2 Interviewees 
Stadium Interviewee Organisation Title 
Carisbrook Mark Perham 
Carisbrook 
Stadium   
Carisbrook Neville Frost   OSH Contractor 
Eden Park Jayson Ryan Red Badge Group Operations Director 
Eden Park Murray Reade Eden Park Stadium   
Eden Park Trevor Sampson Trevor Sampson   
Jade Hamish McLennan 
Holmes Fire and 
Safety Director 
Jade  Jayson Ryan Red Badge Group Operations Director 
MCG Julie McLoughlin 
Melbourne Cricket 
Club 
Manager Safety and 
Training 
MCG Peter Murphy 
 Melbourne 
Cricket Club   
MCG Scott Butler 
Melbourne Cricket 
Club Facilities Manager 
North Harbour Murray Dick 
North Harbour 
Stadium Operations Manager 
North Harbour Neville Trevarton 
New Zealand Fire 
Service 
North Shore District 
Chief Fire Officer 
Stadium Australia/Sydney Cricket 
Ground/ Sydney Football Stadium Bob Russell 
New South Wales 
Fire Brigade Station Commander 
Stadium Australia/Sydney Cricket 
Ground/ Sydney Football Stadium Chris Jurgeit NSW Fire Service Fire Safety Officer 
Sydney Superdome Tony Edwards Sydney Superdome Security Manager 
Waikato Stadium Jayson Ryan Red Badge Group Operations Director 
Waikato Stadium Keith Parker Waikato Stadium 
Stadium Operations 
Manager 
Waikato Stadium Kevin Richards 
New Zealand 





Compliance Ltd Director 
Westpac Trust Colin Clemens 
New Zealand Fire 
Service Fire Safety Officer 
Westpac Trust Mark Nunn 
Westpac Trust 
Stadium Operations Manager 
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8.3 Appendix C – Stadium Statistics
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Yarrow Stadium is not currently functional. Upgrades are scheduled for completion in September 2002.    
Figure 85: Capacities of New Zealand’s main stadia 
 
- 163 - 
 
 
Profile of a New Zealand Stadium 
 
Events held in the last year: 24 
Hours used for events in the last year (excluding preparation time): 241 hours 
 
Occupancy Data for Events over a three-year period 
%age of Capacity 
Occupancy 
Estimated %age of 




















Table 11: Occupancy Data For a New Zealand Stadium 
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eg 90% of the time that the stadium has an event on there is greater 
than 4% of the capacity occupancy. 20% of the time there is greater 
than 85% of the capacity occupancy.7% of the time the stadium is full. 
This stadium is used for events approximately 4.5 hrs per week on 
average.
Average Event Attendance For A New Zealand Stadium Over Three Years
 
Figure 86: Average Event Attendance for a New Zealand Stadium over three years  
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8.4 Appendix D – Stadium Callouts 
Information kindly provided by the New Zealand Fire Service (15th April 2002) 























1990/91 42 2 0 3 4 0 34 85 
1991/92 12 0 0 0 3 0 21 36 
1992/93 43 1 1 0 6 0 38 89 
1993/94 47 1 0 0 9 0 50 108 
1994/95 52 1 0 4 14 3 53 127 
1995/96 75 2 0 4 19 3 76 179 
1996/97 92 4 0 10 28 5 73 212 
1997/98 118 2 0 16 29 2 94 261 
1998/99 96 5 0 18 32 3 115 269 
1999/00 75 3 0 4 31 1 93 207 
2000/01 132 8 1 8 33 2 31 215 
2001/02 125 3 0 5 40 1 0 174 
All Years 909 32 2 72 248 20 678 1,962 
Table 12: Stadium Call Outs By Incident Type 1990-2002 




















North Harbour Stadium 1 1     2 4 
Jade Stadium       7 7 
WestpacTrust Stadium (Wgtn)   1  1  3 5 
WestpacTrust Centre (ChCh)       3 3 
Carisbrook Ground    1 1 1  3 
Eden Park 1      2 3 
Rotorua International Stadium       3 3 
Waikato Stadium  - No data as stadium is new and not in Database 0 
Table 13: Stadium Call Outs By Stadium (1999-2002) 
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Details: Date: Cause: 
North Harbour Stadium 08/16/2000 False alarm -defective 
North Harbour Stadium 06/1/2000 Car/truck fire 
North Harbour Stadium 05/6/2001 Structure Fire with damage 
North Harbour Stadium 01/19/2001 False alarm -defective 
Jade Stadium 06/3/1999 False alarm - accidental operation 
Jade Stadium 09/30/2000 False alarm - excess smoke, heat 
Jade Stadium 03/2/2001 False alarm - good intent - steam/dust mistaken for smoke 
Jade Stadium 09/17/2000 False alarm - accidental operation 
Jade Stadium 03/9/2001 False alarm -defective 
Jade Stadium 03/31/2002 False alarm - malicious 
Jade Stadium 04/3/2001 False alarm -defective 
WestpacTrust Stadium (Wgtn) 10/11/2000 False alarm -defective 
WestpacTrust Stadium (Wgtn) 10/7/2000 False alarm -defective 
WestpacTrust Stadium (Wgtn) 09/7/2000 False alarm - undetermined alarm activation 
WestpacTrust Stadium (Wgtn) 01/30/2001 Rescue - in or under machinery 
WestpacTrust Stadium (Wgtn) 09/5/2001 Assist ambulance 
WestpacTrust Centre (ChCh) 02/25/2001 False alarm - malicious 
WestpacTrust Centre (ChCh) 02/11/2001 False alarm -defective 
WestpacTrust Centre (ChCh) 02/3/2002 False alarm - not classified 
Carisbrook Ground 02/6/2002 Mobile property accident 
Carisbrook Ground 09/17/2001 Repair roof 
Carisbrook Ground 04/7/2001 Liquid, gas spill no fire 
Rotorua International Stadium 02/24/2002 False alarm - accidental operation 
Rotorua International Stadium 03/4/2002 False alarm -defective 
Rotorua International Stadium 08/18/2001 False alarm -defective 
Eden Park 02/10/1999 Structure Fire with damage 
Eden Park 12/13/1999 False alarm - good intent - steam/dust mistaken for smoke 
Eden Park 05/25/2001 False alarm - accidental operation 
Table 14: Stadium Call Out Details By Stadium (1999-2002) 
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8.5 Appendix E – Guide to spread sheet calculations
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Egress Path 1  Description Gate  
Viewed from In front, level Terrain Flat  
Day or Night (D/N) D  Wet, Cold or Dry (W/C/D) D  
Observational Data Value Unit   Value Unit 
Capacity of Stadium (g) 41,000 people Width of path (W) 4.5 metres 
Attendance at event (q) 38,000 people Boundary layer (b) 0.1 metres 
Time to clear stadium (tc) 26 minutes Effective Width (We) 4.3 metres 
Flow Rates        
Time to clear gate/path/stair (h) 26 minutes Specific flow  people/s/m eff. width 
Total usage of gate/path/stair (y) 1982 people     
Time to reach max Fs (t) 5 minutes Max. Specific Flow (Fs -max) 0.71 people/s/m eff. width 
Total usage at max Fs (x) 541 people Population    
Density at max Fs  people/m2     
Time to reach sustained Fs 6 minutes Sustained Specific Flow (Fs) 0.42 people/s/m eff. width 
Duration of sustained Fs 7 minutes Population    
Density at sustained Fs  people/m2     
Queuing time 0 seconds Max. Calculated Flow (Fc) 183 people/minute 
Queue density N/A people/m2     
Boundary layer maintained (Y/N) Y       
Estimated Evacuation Times (if monitored gate flow is representative of all gates) Individual Speeds     
Fraction to leave through gate pre max Fs (A) 0.27  - Travel distance (L)  metres 
Fraction of populous to use gate (B) 0.05  - Terrain    
Total to leave through gate post max Fs (C ) 1441 people Total no. individuals tracked    
Estimated populous to leave pre max Fs (f) 10372 people Mean speed  m/s 
Estimated populous to leave post max Fs (r ) 27628 people Maximum speed  m/s 
Est. min. egress time for gate (Tg) 13 minutes Minimum speed  m/s 
Est. min. egress time for populous (Tp) 13 minutes Density at max. speed  people/m2 
Est. min. egress time for full stadium (Tf) 13 minutes Density at min. speed   people/m2 
Evacuation Estimates (based on established research)          
Anticipated Fs (Fruin)  k=1.40(flat), 1.16 (stair) (m/s) 1.4 people/s/m eff. width 
Anticipated Fc (Fruin)    361 people/minute 
Anticipated Fs (Poyner)  k=1.8 (flat) (m/s) 1.8 people/s/m eff. width 
Anticipated Fc (Poyner)    464 people/minute 
Anticipated density at max Fs assuming max unimpeded speed (Fruin) S=1.19(flat), 1.00 (stair) (m/s) 0.6 people/m2 
Anticipated density at max Fs based on observed mean speed (Fruin)   #DIV/0! people/m2 
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Egress Path 2  Description Vomitory  
Viewed from In front, above Terrain Flat  
Day or Night (D/N) N  Wet, Cold or Dry (W/C/D) DC  
Observational Data Value Unit   Value Unit 
Capacity of Stadium (g) 41,000 people Width of path (W)  metres 
Attendance at event (q) 38,000 people Boundary layer (b)  metres 
Time to clear stadium (tc) 21 minutes Effective Width (We) 0 metres 
Flow Rates        
Time to clear gate/path/stair (h) 21 minutes Specific flow  people/s/m eff. width 
Total usage of gate/path/stair (y)  people     
Time to reach max Fs (t)  minutes Max. Specific Flow (Fs -max)  people/s/m eff. width 
Total usage at max Fs (x)  people Population    
Density at max Fs  people/m2     
Time to reach sustained Fs  minutes Sustained Specific Flow (Fs)  people/s/m eff. width 
Duration of sustained Fs  minutes     
Density at sustained Fs  people/m2     
Queuing time 0 seconds Max. Calculated Flow (Fc)  people/minute 
Queue density N/A people/m2     
Boundary layer maintained (Y/N) N       
Estimated Evacuation Times (if monitored gate flow is representative of all gates) Individual Speeds     
Fraction to leave through gate pre max Fs (A) #DIV/0!  - Travel distance (L) 8.2 metres 
Fraction of populous to use gate (B) 0  - Terrain Flat   
Total to leave through gate post max Fs (C ) 0 people Total no. individuals tracked 50   
Estimated populous to leave pre max Fs (f) #DIV/0! people Mean speed 1.7 m/s 
Estimated populous to leave post max Fs (r ) #DIV/0! people Max. speed 2.7 m/s 
Est. min. egress time for gate (Tg) #DIV/0! minutes Minimum speed 1 m/s 
Est. min. egress time for populous (Tp) #DIV/0! minutes Density at max. speed 0.28* people/m2 
Est. min. egress time for full stadium (Tf) #DIV/0! minutes Density at min. speed  0.34* people/m2 
Evacuation Estimates (based on established research)         
Anticipated Fs (Fruin)  k=1.40(flat), 1.16 (stair) (m/s) 1.4 people/s/m eff. width 
Anticipated Fc (Fruin)    0 people/minute 
Anticipated Fs (Poyner)  k=1.8 (flat) (m/s) 1.8 people/s/m eff. width 
Anticipated Fc (Poyner)    0 people/minute 
Anticipated density at max Fs assuming max unimpeded speed (Fruin) S=1.19(flat), 1.00 (stair) (m/s) 0.0 people/m2 
Anticipated density at max Fs based on observed mean speed (Fruin)   0.00 people/m2 
 * approximate as there was no defined path width           
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Egress Path 3  Description Descending  
Viewed from Below, in front Terrain Stairs  
Day or Night (D/N) N  Wet, Cold or Dry (W/C/D) D   
Observational Data Value Unit   Value Unit 
Capacity of Stadium (g) 38,000 people Width of path (W)  metres 
Attendance at event (q) 37,500 people Boundary layer (b)  metres 
Time to clear stadium (tc) 18 minutes Effective Width (We) 0 metres 
Flow Rates        
Time to clear gate/path/stair (h)  minutes Specific flow  people/s/m eff. width 
Total usage of gate/path/stair (y)  people     
Time to reach max Fs (t)  minutes Max. Specific Flow (Fs -max)  people/s/m eff. width 
Total usage at max Fs (x)  people Population    
Density at max Fs  people/m2     
Time to reach sustained Fs  minutes Sustained Specific Flow (Fs)  people/s/m eff. width 
Duration of sustained Fs  minutes     
Density at sustained Fs  people/m2     
Queuing time 0 seconds Max. Calculated Flow (Fc) 0 people/minute 
Queue density N/A people/m2     
Boundary layer maintained (Y/N) Y       
Estimated Evacuation Times (if monitored gate flow is representative of all gates) Individual Speeds     
Fraction to leave through gate pre max Fs (A) #DIV/0!  - Travel distance (L) 6.5 metres 
Fraction of populous to use gate (B) 0  - Terrain    
Total to leave through gate post max Fs (C ) 0 people Total no. individuals tracked    
Estimated populous to leave pre max Fs (f) #DIV/0! people Mean speed 0.8  m/s 
Estimated populous to leave post max Fs (r ) #DIV/0! people Max. speed 1.3 m/s 
Est. min. egress time for gate (Tg) #DIV/0! minutes Minimum speed 0.1 m/s 
Est. min. egress time for populous (Tp) #DIV/0! minutes Density at max. speed  people/m2 
Est. min. egress time for full stadium (Tf) #DIV/0! minutes Density at min. speed   people/m2 
Evacuation Estimates (based on established research)          
Anticipated Fs (Fruin)  k=1.40(flat), 1.16 (stair) (m/s) 1.16 people/s/m eff. width 
Anticipated Fc (Fruin)    0 people/minute 
Anticipated Fs (Poyner)  k=1.8 (flat) (m/s)  people/s/m eff. width 
Anticipated Fc (Poyner)    0 people/minute 
Anticipated density at max Fs assuming max unimpeded speed (Fruin) S=1.19(flat), 1.00 (stair) (m/s) 0.0 people/m2 
Anticipated density at max Fs based on observed mean speed (Fruin)   0.00 people/m2 
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Egress Path 4  Description Concourse  
Viewed from Above  Terrain Flat  
Day or Night (D/N) D  Wet, Cold or Dry (W/C/D) D  
Observational Data Value Unit   Value Unit 
Capacity of Stadium (g) 38,000 people Width of path (W) 9.5 metres 
Attendance at event (q) 37,500 people Boundary layer (b) 0.46 metres 
Time to clear stadium (tc) 18 minutes Effective Width (We) 8.58 metres 
Flow Rates        
Time to clear gate/path/stair (h) 5 minutes Specific flow  people/s/m eff. width 
Total usage of gate/path/stair (y) 2297 people     
Time to reach max Fs (t) 1.25 minutes Max. Specific Flow (Fs -max) 1.98 people/s/m eff. width 
Total usage at max Fs (x) 908 people Population 77   
Density at max Fs 2.56 people/m2     
Time to reach sustained Fs 1 minutes Sustained Specific Flow (Fs) 0.34 people/s/m eff. width 
Duration of sustained Fs 0.5 minutes     
Density at sustained Fs 0.24 people/m2     
Queuing time 0 seconds Max. Calculated Flow (Fc) 1019 people/minute 
Queue density N/A people/m2     
Boundary layer maintained (Y/N) N        
Estimated Evacuation Times (if monitored gate flow is representative of all gates) Individual Speeds     
Fraction to leave through gate pre max Fs (A) 0.40  - Travel distance (L) 3.5 metres 
Fraction of populous to use gate (B) 0.06  - Terrain Flat   
Total to leave through gate post max Fs (C ) 1389 people Total no. individuals tracked 20   
Estimated populous to leave pre max Fs (f) 14824 people Mean speed 1.5 m/s 
Estimated populous to leave post max Fs (r ) 22676 people Max. speed 1.8 m/s 
Est. min. egress time for gate (Tg) 3 minutes Minimum speed 1.0 m/s 
Est. min. egress time for populous (Tp) 6 minutes Density at max. speed  people/m2 
Est. min. egress time for full stadium (Tf) 6 minutes Density at min. speed   people/m2 
Evacuation Estimates (based on established research)          
Anticipated Fs (Fruin)  k=1.40(flat), 1.16 (stair) (m/s) 1.4 people/s/m eff. width 
Anticipated Fc (Fruin)    721 people/minute 
Anticipated Fs (Poyner)  k=1.8 (flat) (m/s) 1.8 people/s/m eff. width 
Anticipated Fc (Poyner)    927 people/minute  
Anticipated density at max Fs assuming max unimpeded speed (Fruin) S=1.19(flat), 1.00 (stair) (m/s) 1.7 people/m2 
Anticipated density at max Fs based on observed mean speed (Fruin)   0.23 people/m2 
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Egress Path 7  Description Descending  
Viewed from Below  Terrain Stair  
Day or Night (D/N) N  Wet, Cold or Dry (W/C/D) D   
Observational Data Value Unit   Value Unit 
Capacity of Stadium (g) 38,000 people Width of path (W) 1.5 metres 
Attendance at event (q) 20,000 people Boundary layer (b) 0.15 metres 
Time to clear stadium (tc) 17 minutes Effective Width (We) 1.2 metres 
Flow Rates        
Time to clear gate/path/stair (h) 10 minutes Specific flow  people/s/m eff. width 
Total usage of gate/path/stair (y) 651 people     
Time to reach max Fs (t) 2 minutes Max. Specific Flow (Fs -max) 1.31 people/s/m eff. width 
Total usage at max Fs (x) 158 people Population 13   
Density at max Fs 3 people/m2     
Time to reach sustained Fs 2.5 minutes Sustained Specific Flow (Fs) 1.1 people/s/m eff. width 
Duration of sustained Fs 8 minutes     
Density at sustained Fs 2.8 people/m2     
Queuing time 8 seconds Max. Calculated Flow (Fc) 94 people/minute 
Queue density 4.1 people/m2     
Boundary layer maintained (Y/N) Y       
Estimated Evacuation Times (if monitored gate flow is representative of all gates) Individual Speeds     
Fraction to leave through gate pre max Fs (A) 0.24  - Travel distance (L) 3.6 metres 
Fraction of populous to use gate (B) 0.03  - Terrain Stair   
Total to leave through gate post max Fs (C ) 493 people Total no. individuals tracked 33   
Estimated populous to leave pre max Fs (f) 4854 people Mean speed 0.4 m/s 
Estimated populous to leave post max Fs (r ) 15146 people Max. speed 0.5 m/s 
Est. min. egress time for gate (Tg) 7 minutes Minimum speed 0.2 m/s 
Est. min. egress time for populous (Tp) 11 minutes Density at max. speed  people/m2 
Est. min. egress time for full stadium (Tf) 19 minutes Density at min. speed   people/m2 
Evacuation Estimates (based on established research)          
Anticipated Fs (Fruin)  k=1.40(flat), 1.16 (stair) (m/s) 1.16 people/s/m eff. width 
Anticipated Fc (Fruin)    84 people/minute 
Anticipated Fs (Poyner)  k=1.8 (flat) (m/s)  people/s/m eff. width 
Anticipated Fc (Poyner)    0 people/minute 
Anticipated density at max Fs assuming max unimpeded speed (Fruin) S=1.19(flat), 1.00 (stair) (m/s) 1.3 people/m2 
Anticipated density at max Fs based on observed mean speed (Fruin)   2.75 people/m2 
            
Egress Path 8  Description Concourse  
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Viewed from Above  Terrain Flat  
Day or Night (D/N) D  Wet, Cold or Dry (W/C/D) D  
Observational Data Value Unit   Value Unit 
Capacity of Stadium (g) 38,000 people Width of path (W) 2.5 metres 
Attendance at event (q) 18,000 people Boundary layer (b) 0.2 metres 
Time to clear stadium (tc) 18 minutes Effective Width (We) 2.1 metres 
Flow Rates        
Time to clear gate/path/stair (h) 6 minutes Specific flow  people/s/m eff. width 
Total usage of gate/path/stair (y) 551 people     
Time to reach max Fs (t) 2 minutes Max. Specific Flow (Fs -max) 0.84 people/s/m eff. width 
Total usage at max Fs (x) 178 people Population 37   
Density at max Fs 3.8 people/m2     
Time to reach sustained Fs 0.5 minutes Sustained Specific Flow (Fs) 0.79 people/s/m eff. width 
Duration of sustained Fs 4.5 minutes     
Density at sustained Fs 2.6 people/m2     
Queuing time 0 seconds Max. Calculated Flow (Fc) 106 people/minute 
Queue density N/A people/m2     
Boundary layer maintained (Y/N) N        
Estimated Evacuation Times (if monitored gate flow is representative of all gates) Individual Speeds     
Fraction to leave through gate pre max Fs (A) 0.32  - Travel distance (L) 4.6 metres 
Fraction of populous to use gate (B) 0.03  - Terrain Flat   
Total to leave through gate post max Fs (C ) 373 people Total no. individuals tracked 20   
Estimated populous to leave pre max Fs (f) 5814 people Mean speed 0.4 m/s 
Estimated populous to leave post max Fs (r ) 12185 people Max. speed 0.5 m/s 
Est. min. egress time for gate (Tg) 6 minutes Minimum speed 0.3 m/s 
Est. min. egress time for populous (Tp) 13 minutes Density at max. speed  people/m2 
Est. min. egress time for full stadium (Tf) 24 minutes Density at min. speed   people/m2 
Evacuation Estimates (based on established research)          
Anticipated Fs (Fruin)  k=1.40(flat), 1.16 (stair) (m/s) 1.4 people/s/m eff. width 
Anticipated Fc (Fruin)    176 people/minute 
Anticipated Fs (Poyner)  k=1.8 (flat) (m/s) 1.8 people/s/m eff. width 
Anticipated Fc (Poyner)    227 people/minute 
Anticipated density at max Fs assuming max unimpeded speed (Fruin) S=1.19(flat), 1.00 (stair) (m/s) 0.7 people/m2 
Anticipated density at max Fs based on observed mean speed (Fruin)   1.98 people/m2 
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Egress Path 10  Description Concourse  
Viewed from Above, in front Terrain Flat  
Day or Night (D/N) N  Wet, Cold or Dry (W/C/D) DC  
Observational Data Value Unit   Value Unit 
Capacity of Stadium (g) 50,000 people Width of path (W) 3 metres 
Attendance at event (q) 25,000 people Boundary layer (b) 0.2 metres 
Time to clear stadium (tc) 19 minutes Effective Width (We) 2.6 metres 
Flow Rates        
Time to clear gate/path/stair (h)  minutes Specific flow  people/s/m eff. width 
Total usage of gate/path/stair (y)  people     
Time to reach max Fs (t) 10.75 minutes Max. Specific Flow (Fs -max) 1.94 people/s/m eff. width 
Total usage at max Fs (x)  people Population 30   
Density at max Fs 3 people/m2     
Time to reach sustained Fs 7.5 minutes Sustained Specific Flow (Fs) 1.53 people/s/m eff. width 
Duration of sustained Fs 2.5 minutes     
Density at sustained Fs 2.8 people/m2     
Queuing time 0 seconds Max. Calculated Flow (Fc) 303 people/minute 
Queue density N/A people/m2     
Boundary layer maintained (Y/N) N       
Estimated Evacuation Times (if monitored gate flow is representative of all gates) Individual Speeds     
Fraction to leave through gate pre max Fs (A) #DIV/0!  - Travel distance (L) 3.9 metres 
Fraction of populous to use gate (B) 0  - Terrain Flat   
Total to leave through gate post max Fs (C ) 0 people Total no. individuals tracked 10   
Estimated populous to leave pre max Fs (f) #DIV/0! people Mean speed 0.5 m/s 
Estimated populous to leave post max Fs (r ) #DIV/0! people Max. speed 0.7 m/s 
Est. min. egress time for gate (Tg) 11 minutes Minimum speed 0.4 m/s 
Est. min. egress time for populous (Tp) #DIV/0! minutes Density at max. speed  people/m2 
Est. min. egress time for full stadium (Tf) #DIV/0! minutes Density at min. speed   people/m2 
Evacuation Estimates (based on established research)          
Anticipated Fs (Fruin)  k=1.40(flat), 1.16 (stair) (m/s) 1.4 people/s/m eff. width 
Anticipated Fc (Fruin)    218 people/minute 
Anticipated Fs (Poyner)  k=1.8 (flat) (m/s) 1.8 people/s/m eff. width 
Anticipated Fc (Poyner)    281 people/minute 
Anticipated density at max Fs assuming max unimpeded speed (Fruin) S=1.19(flat), 1.00 (stair) (m/s) 1.6 people/m2 
Anticipated density at max Fs based on observed mean speed (Fruin)   3.06 people/m2 
            
 
Egress Path 13  Description Concourse (half time) 
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Viewed from Above, side on Terrain Flat  
Day or Night (D/N) N  Wet, Cold or Dry (W/C/D) D  
Observational Data Value Unit   Value Unit 
Capacity of Stadium (g) 27,000 people Width of path (W) 5.4 metres 
Attendance at event (q) 27,000 people Boundary layer (b) 0.46 metres 
Time to clear stadium (tc) 18 minutes Effective Width (We) 4.48 metres 
Flow Rates        
Time to clear gate/path/stair (h)  minutes Specific flow  people/s/m eff. width 
Total usage of gate/path/stair (y)  people     
Time to reach max Fs (t) 0.75 minutes Max. Specific Flow (Fs -max) 1.87 people/s/m eff. width 
Total usage at max Fs (x)  people Population 61   
Density at max Fs 3 people/m2     
Time to reach sustained Fs 6 minutes Sustained Specific Flow (Fs) 1.51 people/s/m eff. width 
Duration of sustained Fs 1.5 minutes     
Density at sustained Fs 1.9 people/m2     
Queuing time 0 seconds Max. Calculated Flow (Fc) 503 people/minute 
Queue density N/A people/m2     
Boundary layer maintained (Y/N) Y       
Estimated Evacuation Times (if monitored gate flow is representative of all gates) Individual Speeds     
Fraction to leave through gate pre max Fs (A) #DIV/0!  - Travel distance (L) 4.5 metres 
Fraction of populous to use gate (B) 0  - Terrain Flat   
Total to leave through gate post max Fs (C ) 0 people Total no. individuals tracked    
Estimated populous to leave pre max Fs (f) #DIV/0! people Mean speed 0.7 m/s 
Estimated populous to leave post max Fs (r ) #DIV/0! people Max. speed 1.1 m/s 
Est. min. egress time for gate (Tg) 1 minutes Minimum speed 0.4 m/s 
Est. min. egress time for populous (Tp) #DIV/0! minutes Density at max. speed  people/m2 
Est. min. egress time for full stadium (Tf) #DIV/0! minutes Density at min. speed   people/m2 
Evacuation Estimates (based on established research)          
Anticipated Fs (Fruin)  k=1.40(flat), 1.16 (stair) (m/s) 1.4 people/s/m eff. width 
Anticipated Fc (Fruin)    376 people/minute 
Anticipated Fs (Poyner)  k=1.8 (flat) (m/s) 1.8 people/s/m eff. width 
Anticipated Fc (Poyner)    484 people/minute 
Anticipated density at max Fs assuming max unimpeded speed (Fruin) S=1.19(flat), 1.00 (stair) (m/s) 1.6 people/m2 
Anticipated density at max Fs based on observed mean speed (Fruin)   2.16 people/m2 
            
 
Egress Path 14  Description Concourse  
Viewed from Above, side on Terrain Flat  
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Day or Night (D/N) N  Wet, Cold or Dry (W/C/D) D  
Observational Data Value Unit   Value Unit 
Capacity of Stadium (g) 27,000 people Width of path (W) 5.4 metres 
Attendance at event (q) 27,000 people Boundary layer (b) 0.46 metres 
Time to clear stadium (tc) 18 minutes Effective Width (We) 4.48 metres 
Flow Rates        
Time to clear gate/path/stair (h) 10 minutes Specific flow  people/s/m eff. width 
Total usage of gate/path/stair (y) 1667 people     
Time to reach max Fs (t) 2 minutes Max. Specific Flow (Fs -max) 1.55 people/s/m eff. width 
Total usage at max Fs (x) 501 people Population 49   
Density at max Fs 2.4 people/m2     
Time to reach sustained Fs 4.5 minutes Sustained Specific Flow (Fs) 1.23 people/s/m eff. width 
Duration of sustained Fs 1.5 minutes     
Density at sustained Fs 1.4 people/m2     
Queuing time 0 seconds Max. Calculated Flow (Fc) 417 people/minute 
Queue density N/A people/m2     
Boundary layer maintained (Y/N) Y       
Estimated Evacuation Times (if monitored gate flow is representative of all gates) Individual Speeds     
Fraction to leave through gate pre max Fs (A) 0.30  - Travel distance (L) 4.5 metres 
Fraction of populous to use gate (B) 0.06  - Terrain Flat   
Total to leave through gate post max Fs (C ) 1166 people Total no. individuals tracked 20   
Estimated populous to leave pre max Fs (f) 8115 people Mean speed 0.9 m/s 
Estimated populous to leave post max Fs (r ) 18885 people Max. speed 1.5 m/s 
Est. min. egress time for gate (Tg) 5 minutes Minimum speed 0.6 m/s 
Est. min. egress time for populous (Tp) 7 minutes Density at max. speed  people/m2 
Est. min. egress time for full stadium (Tf) 7 minutes Density at min. speed   people/m2 
Evacuation Estimates (based on established research)          
Anticipated Fs (Fruin)  k=1.40(flat), 1.16 (stair) (m/s) 1.4 people/s/m eff. width 
Anticipated Fc (Fruin)    376 people/minute 
Anticipated Fs (Poyner)  k=1.8 (flat) (m/s) 1.8 people/s/m eff. width 
Anticipated Fc (Poyner)    484 people/minute 
Anticipated density at max Fs assuming max unimpeded speed (Fruin) S=1.19(flat), 1.00 (stair) (m/s) 1.3 people/m2 
Anticipated density at max Fs based on observed mean speed (Fruin)   1.37 people/m2 
            
 
Egress Path 15  Description Aisle  
Viewed from Above, behind Terrain Ascending  
Day or Night (D/N) N  Wet, Cold or Dry (W/C/D) D  
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Observational Data Value Unit   Value Unit 
Capacity of Stadium (g) 27,000 people Width of path (W) 1.5 metres 
Attendance at event (q) 27,000 people Boundary layer (b) 0.1 metres 
Time to clear stadium (tc) 18 minutes Effective Width (We) 1.3 metres 
Flow Rates        
Time to clear gate/path/stair (h) 4.5 minutes Specific flow  people/s/m eff. width 
Total usage of gate/path/stair (y) 274 people     
Time to reach max Fs (t) 2.5 minutes Max. Specific Flow (Fs -max) 1.72 people/s/m eff. width 
Total usage at max Fs (x) 78 people Population    
Density at max Fs  people/m2     
Time to reach sustained Fs  minutes Sustained Specific Flow (Fs) 1.64 people/s/m eff. width 
Duration of sustained Fs  minutes     
Density at sustained Fs  people/m2     
Queuing time 0 seconds Max. Calculated Flow (Fc) 134 people/minute 
Queue density N/A people/m2     
Boundary layer maintained (Y/N) ?       
Estimated Evacuation Times (if monitored gate flow is representative of all gates) Individual Speeds     
Fraction to leave through gate pre max Fs (A) 0.28  - Travel distance (L)  metres 
Fraction of populous to use gate (B) 0.01  - Terrain Flat   
Total to leave through gate post max Fs (C ) 196 people Total no. individuals tracked    
Estimated populous to leave pre max Fs (f) 7686 people Mean speed  m/s 
Estimated populous to leave post max Fs (r ) 19313 people Max. speed  m/s 
Est. min. egress time for gate (Tg) 4 minutes Minimum speed  m/s 
Est. min. egress time for populous (Tp) 8 minutes Density at max. speed  people/m2 
Est. min. egress time for full stadium (Tf) 8 minutes Density at min. speed   people/m2 
Evacuation Estimates (based on established research)          
Anticipated Fs (Fruin)  k=1.40(flat), 1.16 (stair) (m/s) 1.4 people/s/m eff. width 
Anticipated Fc (Fruin)    109 people/minute 
Anticipated Fs (Poyner)  k=1.8 (flat) (m/s) 1.8 people/s/m eff. width 
Anticipated Fc (Poyner)    140 people/minute 
Anticipated density at max Fs assuming max unimpeded speed (Fruin) S=1.19(flat), 1.00 (stair) (m/s) 1.4 people/m2 
Anticipated density at max Fs based on observed mean speed (Fruin)   #DIV/0! people/m2 
            
 
Egress Path 18  Description Vomitory  
Viewed from Above, in front Terrain Flat  
Day or Night (D/N) N  Wet, Cold or Dry (W/C/D) D  
Observational Data Value Unit   Value Unit 
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Capacity of Stadium (g) 34,500 people Width of path (W) 1.7 metres 
Attendance at event (q) 31,000 people Boundary layer (b) 0.15 metres 
Time to clear stadium (tc) 14 minutes Effective Width (We) 1.4 metres 
Flow Rates        
Time to clear gate/path/stair (h) 5 minutes Specific flow  people/s/m eff. width 
Total usage of gate/path/stair (y) 441 people     
Time to reach max Fs (t) 0.75 minutes Max. Specific Flow (Fs -max) 1.88 people/s/m eff. width 
Total usage at max Fs (x) 93 people Population    
Density at max Fs 1.2 people/m2     
Time to reach sustained Fs  minutes Sustained Specific Flow (Fs)  people/s/m eff. width 
Duration of sustained Fs  minutes     
Density at sustained Fs  people/m2     
Queuing time 0 seconds Max. Calculated Flow (Fc) 158 people/minute 
Queue density N/A people/m2     
Boundary layer maintained (Y/N) Y       
Estimated Evacuation Times (if monitored gate flow is representative of all gates) Individual Speeds     
Fraction to leave through gate pre max Fs (A) 0.21  - Travel distance (L)  metres 
Fraction of populous to use gate (B) 0.01  - Terrain    
Total to leave through gate post max Fs (C ) 348 people Total no. individuals tracked    
Estimated populous to leave pre max Fs (f) 6537 people Mean speed  m/s 
Estimated populous to leave post max Fs (r ) 24462 people Max. speed  m/s 
Est. min. egress time for gate (Tg) 3 minutes Minimum speed  m/s 
Est. min. egress time for populous (Tp) 7 minutes Density at max. speed  people/m2 
Est. min. egress time for full stadium (Tf) 8 minutes Density at min. speed   people/m2 
Evacuation Estimates (based on established research)          
Anticipated Fs (Fruin)  k=1.40(flat), 1.16 (stair) (m/s) 1.4 people/s/m eff. width 
Anticipated Fc (Fruin)    118 people/minute 
Anticipated Fs (Poyner)  k=1.8 (flat) (m/s) 1.8 people/s/m eff. width 
Anticipated Fc (Poyner)    151 people/minute 
Anticipated density at max Fs assuming max unimpeded speed (Fruin) S=1.19(flat), 1.00 (stair) (m/s) 1.6 people/m2 
Anticipated density at max Fs based on observed mean speed (Fruin)   #DIV/0! people/m2 
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